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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
The Morality of Capitalism
Through most of recent history, capitalism has been
the economic system that dare not speak its name. Americans, who have been in practice the most enthusiastic
capitalists of modern times, have gone to considerable
lengths to avoid applying the label to themselves. Asked
to define just what it is that constitutes the American
way of life, most Americans rely on such terms as freedom, democracy, individualism, or equal opportunity.
If pushed for greater specificity, they might, with some
hesitation, refer to the free enterprise system. Only with
the greatest reluctance, however, would they designate
their system or themselves as what it and they so clearly
are: capitalist. The American system is one of democratic capitalism, and yet ordinary citizens prefer to ignore,
if not quite deny, the economic component of their society's model of political economy. It is cap italism's
enemies, not its friends, who are most likely to employ
the term.
At one level, this might seem an odd state of affairs.
Capitalism, after all, has had an extraordinary record of
success. The prosperity of the West has been built upon
it. It has brought more wealth to more people than any
economic arrangement ever conceived. And capitalism
has accomplished this while providing a social context
that tends, more often than not, to the establishment
of political freedom.
Yet outside the confines of the business community
or the textbooks of neoclassical economists, capitalism
seldom receives the praise it would seem to merit, and
the reasons for that lack of appreciation are not difficult to discern. Capitalism produces wealth and allows
for freedom , but it offers little or no opportunity for
moral heroism. Indeed, it seems rooted in personal
qualities quite the opposite of heroic. Adam Smith,
capitalism's ultimate defender, spoke in distinctly unflattering terms of the capitalists' "natural selfishness
and rapacity," of their preoccupation with "their own
conveniency" and "the gratification of their own vain
and insatiable desires" (though of course he went on to
argue that taken together and guided by the workings
of the free market's invisible hand, all those individual
acts of elfishness led in the end to the achievement of
the common good) .
It i this lack of moral appeal that ha left capitalism
at uch a di advantage in it ideological competition
' 'th ocialism, a disadvantage that i otherwi e difficult to account for. ociali min practice has had a r cord as unimpre ive as capitali m ' ha b en ucce ful.
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(Socialism is here defined in its dictionary sense of the
public ownership and control of the means of production. If the term socialist is to retain any descriptive precision, it should not casually be attached, ~s it so often
is, to Western European or North American systems
that would better be designated as welfare-state capitalist or social democratic.) In both advanced and developing societies, socialist econc,mic systems have produced
less well than comparable capitalist ones, and they have
in every case been accompanied by political repression.
Freedom may not always follow on capitalism, but, at
least on the record to date, it never follows on socialism.
Yet for all its failures, socialism retains its stature, at
least among intellectuals and moralists, as a moral ideal.
It is presented as what man at his best might attain to.
Socialism is seen as more than an economic system: to
its most fervent adherents, it is a way of life. (Capitalism's defenders rarely burden their system with such
grand imaginings: as already noted, Americans speak
often of their democratic way of life , almost never
of their capitalist way of life.) Socialism has frequently
been depicted by liberal clergymen as applied Christianity; only a few eccentric conservative churchmen
have attempted a similar exaltation of capitalism.
It is precisely the inability of capitalism to compete
with socialism on the level of moral yearning that has
led some recent apologists to attempt to rehabilitate its
moral reputation. The most notable of these is George
Gilder, whose widely-noticed Wealth and Poverty stands
as the most ambitious effort to re cue capitali m from
the charge that it represents the institutionalization of
greed and self-interest. Capitalism works, Gilder ay
in a recent summary of his book's the is, not because
"it miraculously transmutes personal avarice and ambition into collective prosp erity" but r ather b cau e
"it calls forth , propagates, and r elie up n the be t and
most generou of human qualitie ':
T he process of capitalist inv tment, for all the obvious differ nc ,
bears a close relation hip to the ritual gift-giving that anthrop l<r
gists have discovered to b universal in primitive life. These gifts
are not offered without the exp ctation of a return ; the outcom depends on the voluntary respon e of other . In order to mak a uccessful gift, the giver mu t fi rst uppres hi own appetite ( ave)
whi le at the ame time figuring out the desir of the recipi nt. To
the extent the r cipi nts value the ift mor than th giver . the
profits of the syst m-in thi cas , th circl of human ympathy will expand.
The giving impul in modern capitali m i
important, no I central to all creative and pi ucti activit , than
in a primitive tribe. Look at the unendin offerin
f entrepren urs :
investin capital, creatin product , building bu in
, inv ntin
job . accumulatin in entorie . The contributi n - all Ion befor
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Because capitalist societies tend to separate economics and politics, they are less susceptible
to the temptations of power than are socialist regimes, in which the two are inseparable.
any return is received , all without any assurance that the enterprise
will not fail-constitute a pattern of giving that dwarfs in extent and
in practical generosity any primitive rite of exchange. Giving is the
vital impulse and moral center of capitalism ; give and you will be
given unto is its fundamental law.

The argument is intriguing but not, in the end, persuasive. The capitalist's "gifts," even if understood in
terms of ritual, have to do with calculated risk rather
than with "generosity." Capitalism rests not on "give
and you will be given unto" but on "risk and you may-be
rewarded." If the language of greed and rapacity judges
capitalism too harshly, talk of gift-giving and generosity sentimentalizes it.
We can understand (and sympathize with) Mr. Gilder's
desire to establish a moral defense for capitalism and
thus "close the schism between Western morality and
Western economics." He is right to be concerned with
the cost to Western morale that follows from the widespread denigration of capitalist values, especially as
those values are measured against the presumed moral
splendor of socialism. But when he argues that to be involved in capitalist activities is to be "engaged in the
highest of human callings: the service of others and the
fulfillment of faith," he has moved beyond evidence and
common sense to the realm of myth and fantasy. To
resist the notion that capitalists are devils we need not
pretend that they are saints.
The case for capitalism-a case that includes but does
not solely rest on moral judgments-should begin and
end with less elevated claims. We have already alluded
briefly to two of them: capitalism's economic vitality
and its bias in the direction of free institutions. It seems
curious that moralists should offhandedly dismiss an
economic system whose productive capacities have had
so beneficial an effect on the lives of millions of ordinary
men and women. If the West, under capitalism, has not
abolished poverty, it has come nearer to doing so than
has anyone else under any other system. (Those who
credit the welfare state rather than capitalism with the
reduction of poverty might reflect for a moment on
what it is that creates the surplus out of which welfare
is provided. In any case, the stimulation by capitalism
of overall economic growth has done more to aid the
mass of people than has the welfare state.)
For all of socialism's eloquent egalitarian sentiments,
it has accomplished far less in the way of alleviation of
human suffering than has capitalism. The capitalist's
claim that socialism provides an excellent mechanism
for the equal distribution of poverty rests on what is .by
now a considerable accumulation of evidence. Capitalism's historical and contemporary imperfections are
well-known: exploitation, wastefulness, uneven development, tendencies to oligopoly, unequal distribution
of wealth and income. But no society undergoing economic modernization under capitalism has experienced
4

anything like the appalling human costs that have accompanied the building of socialism in nations like the
Soviet Union, China, or any number of Third World
countries.
The record with respect to political freedom is much
the same. We all know that many capitalist societies
are oppressive and authoritarian, some cruelly so. But
we also know that of the relative handful of societies
in the world in which civil liberties, democratic freedoms, and human rights flourish, all have economic
systems that are essentially capitalist in structure. (The
Scandinavian countries, which are certainly free and
democratic, are sometimes referred to as having traveled a "middle way" between capitalism and socialism, but that middle way leans considerably closer to
the capitalist side of the road than to the side paved by
Karl Marx and those who have come after him.) Because
capitalist societies tend to separate economics and politics, they are less susceptible to the temptations of power
than are socialist regimes, in which the two are inseparable. Critics frequently point out the high degree of
concentration of private power in modern capitalist
economies. But concentrations of power are inescapable
in industrial society, and the relatively pluralistic nature of democratic capitalism disperses that power far
more effectively than any collectivist alternative.
It is capitalism's great benefit- and this is the point
Mr. Gilder does not seem to grasp-that its moral claims
remain more modest than those of socialism. Capitalism
recommends itself to us precisely because it is just an
economic system and not a way of life or a moral ideal.
Because it makes no attempt to be all-encompassing, it
leaves room for a whole host of interests, activities, associations, virtues, values, and beliefs outside itself. It
does not seek to monopolize our lives and loyalties, and
its successful implementation does not depend on our
being other than what we are. We hear often of the "new
socialist man" that Marxism or one of its derivatives is
supposed to create; capitalism has no such utopian pretensions.
The socialist ideal of egalitarian altruism demands
of man more than his moral constitution will allow: it
requires a regimen of perpetual moral heroism. Since
few of us are capable of conducting our lives at that
constant pitch, those who would institute a socialist
order can only do so through massive coercion, which
corrupts the leaders even as it oppresses the led. It is
the incompatability between socialism's moral requirements and the flawed human material with which any
political order must work that explains why democratic
socialism remains a social ideal rather than a political reality.
Capitalism, by contrast, take people as they are rather
than as we would have them be and as Adam mith inThe Cresset

Democratic capitalism can withstand the moral scrutiny of all save those for whom social standards
are set not by the realities of the world we know and inhabit but by visions of the heavenly city.

dicated, harnesses their inevitable self-interest to social
benefit. Critics of capitalism argue that its ethos of competition and individual self-advancement licenses unbridled greed and social savagery; they can only conceive
of a capitalist society as a Darwinian jungle. But modem
capitalism-as modified, regulated, and restrained by
democratic politics-has demonstrated that it is not
necessarily antithetical to social decency. American
economic life has its unlovely aspects, but it is not simply a jungle in which only the fit survive. Moreover,
capitalism has demonstrated its capacity for evoking
creative human self-expression. If the qualities of imagination, resourcefulness, optimism, and confidence that
it encourages and rewards are not the most sublime of
human endowments, they do work for both individual
happiness and social development.
All this being said, important qualifiers must be
added. Capitalism is not sacrosanct. It is morally defensible in general, but that broad moral acceptability
does not bestow a mantle of inviolability upon laissezfaire economics. We are properly skeptical toward those
who devise what are in effect theologies of socialism,
and we should be equally suspicious of those who would
do the same for capitalism. Free-market relations carry
no divine sanction, and schemes of government regulation and planning should be judged on their efficacy,
not on whether or not they violate some presumed absolute individual right to control of one's own property.
It may be that a capitalism overburdened with controls and restrictions will work less well than it otherwise
would. If that is so, such controls and restrictions can
legitimately be opposed for their negative effects on the
well-being of the men and women who suffer when the
economy falters. But in our current mood of suspicion
toward government regulation, we should never forget
the crucial humanizing effects that democratic intervention has had on capitalist societies. A capitalism
divorced from social concern can be a moral monstrosity. Even if it were the case (as it is not) that the free
market distributed its rewards in perfect correlation
with individual talent and effort, we would still
be morally required to care for those who lacked the
requisite economic skills to keep up with the rest of
ociety. Unrestrained capitalism can turn into a social
jungle, and, for Christians at least, any such social
order must be intolerable.
(Though this does not mean that the government
must be the sole or even primary dispenser of charity,
or that the concept of charity necessarily entails an elaborate ystem of economic and social "rights.,, In the field
of ocial welfare, claims of moral nece sity cannot automatically override considerations of prudence and practicability. Part of our moral duty is to find out what
do and doe not in fact work for the general welfare.)

January 1982

Social constructs should be our servants rather than
our masters. It is of little use to discuss economic or political systems in purely abstract terms. If we are sensible, we will make our judgments concerning capitalism
or socialism on the basis of the effects they have on people's lives rather than on the theoretical or moral elegance of the models their apologists provide for them.
From such an empirical perspective, democratic capitalism can withstand the moral scrutiny ofall save those
for whom social standards are set not by the realities
of the world we know and inhabit but by visions of the
heavenly city. Capitalism is not a perfect system, and we
should always be open to the possibility that something
better might someday supersede it; but in the meantime,
it is worth defending against the ideologues and perfectionists who are its inevitable enemies.
Cl

Concerning the Moral Majority
We have not written before now on the subject of the
Moral Majority for at least two reasons. In the first
place, the topic has been so thoroughly, not to say exhaustively, discussed elsewhere that we felt our subscribers might be no more anxious to read yet another
commentary on the matter than we were eager to write
one. In the second place, our views on the MM are so
ambivalent that we feared that any editorial comment
might come out as meaningless blather. But it is by now
past time to face up to editorial responsibilities, disregard the problem of MM-overload, and try to impose
some order on the tangle of contradictory reactions we
(and possibly others) have experienced on the issue.
The problem begins with definition. Strictly construed, the term Moral Majority refers simply to the particular politico-religious group headed by the Reverend
Jerry Falwell. In popular usage, however, it take in the
whole range of individuals and group who make up the
politicized segment of the evangelical religious right.
For many liberals, it has become a term of opprobrium
that encompasses, in shorthand form, all manifestations
of cultural conservatism. For our pre ent purpo es, we
shall adopt popular usage, i.e., that which connotes the
evangelical/fundamentali t Prote tant right. (The pitfalls of uch u age hould b noted: the R verend Billy
Graham, whom no one has ever accu ed of being ither
a theological or political liberal, ha poken out again t
the politico-religiou right' tend ncy to pe ify th will
of God on particular political i u
and he i not at all
alone among th ological con rvati
in holding uch
views. Inde d the Moral Majority r pr en a d viation from the dominant tradition of van elical/fundam ntali t
merican Prot tanti m whi h ha b n
more often apolitical than politicall acti i t.)

s

We are uncomfortable with the Moral Majority's too-easy certainties, and we cannot share the
blessed assurance with which its adherents discern the Lord's will in the details of social affairs.

If we understand the impulse behind the Moral Majority correctly, there is much that concerns them that
ought to concern the rest of us as well. One need not
agree with the MM's stand on all issues (as we emphatically do not) to share their discontent with many of the
cultural currents in American life today. There is nothing intrinsically reactionary in supporting traditional
values relating to family, country, and religion, or in
opposing such dubious fruits of modernity as permiss_ive
sexual mores, gay rights (when taken to require moral
acceptance of homosexual behavior), abortion on demand, refusal of responsibility for personal actions (the
devil-or society-made me do it), unrestricted circulation of pornography, or the more extreme versions of
women's liberation (e.g., those rooted in hatred of men
or wedded to the ideal of an androgynous society).
Those of us for whom not everything in contemporary
culture is automatically to be applauded should see to it
that our concerns do not fall by default entirely into the
hands of fringe political or religious groups. (Recent
studies indicate that people with evangelical/fundamentalist religious views are only marginally more conservative on socio-economic issues than are members of
liberal churches; it is their perspective on cultural questions that sharply distinguishes the evangelicals from
mainstream Protestant opinion.)
Disagreement on specific issues aside, many of us
have problems with the manner in which members of
the Moral Majority address the questions that concern
them. Some of what they say is mean-spirited; much of
it is ignorant; most all of it is unsophisticated. Matters
that require careful distinctions get reduced to crude
generalizations, and moral niceties get lost sight of in a
desperate scramble for moral certainties. Thus, for example, even many of us unpersuaded by the moral
claims behind the gay rights movement wanted to distance ourselves from the gay-bashing overtones of the
Anita Bryant anti-homosexual crusade in Florida and
elsewhere. This is not mere intellectual fastidiousness;
the integrity (or lack of it) with which positions are advanced can never entirely be separated from the substance of the positions themselves. The social health of
a society depends as much on how arguments are conducted as o~ who wins the arguments (especially since
large social questions are seldom definitively won or
lost).
The actual strength of the Moral Majority is difficult
to measure. Immediately after the 1980 elections, it
made extravagant claims about its influence in defeating a number of liberal Democratic Senators it had
targeted for special attention. Those claims were picked
up in fear and trembling by the MM's liberal opponents,
most notably Norman Lear, the television producer,
who claimed to see in the MM a mortal threat to Amer6

ican "pluralism, diversity, and tolerance," and who
founded an organization, People for the American Way
(love that name), whose sole reason for being is to save
the nation from the "radical religious right." (One wonders where Mr. Lear's concern for pluralism and tolerance was hiding during all those years when the National Council of Churches and other liberal religious
groups were pronouncing their anathemas on all those
who failed to support their versions of political moral
rectitude.)
Definitive studies of the effects of the Moral Majority
on the 1980 election results are not yet available, but
preliminary evidence strongly suggests that its influence has been vastly exaggerated by friends and enemies alike. (See, for example, the article, "The Election
& the Evangelicals," by Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl
Raab in the March, 1981 issue of Commentary.) It turns
out that the average percentage decline in votes between
1974 and 1980 among the Northern Democratic Senators targeted for defeat by religious and other rightwing groups was virtually identical with the average
decline among untargeted Northern Democratic Senators. On the Presidential level, a slightly smaller percentage of born-again white Protestants voted for conservative Ronald Reagan than did non-born-again white
Protestants, and Jimmy Carter lost more support between 1976 and 1980 among Jews, Catholics, and mainstream Protestants than he did among the evangelicals.
Carter and the liberal Democratic Senators were indeed
caught in a conservative surge, but that surge does not
appear to have been the product of a new radical religious right.
Influential or not, how should the Moral Majoritarians be assessed? We end as we began, with uncertainity.
We do not find them the great national peril that others
do. We understand and in some ways share their concerns, and we agree that those concerns should have
received greater attention than they have. The "secular
humanists" who loom so large in the MM's catalog of
evils do dominate much of the nation's elite intellectual
culture, and they have tended to treat the discontents of
religious conservatives with incomprehension, indifference, or contempt.
But in the last analysis, the Moral Majority embodies
a temper foreign to us. It speaks with a voice that is too
often harsh or hysterical. We are uncomfortable with the
MM's too-easy certainties, and we cannot share the
blessed assurance with which its adherents discern the
Lord's will in the details of mundane affairs. There are
items on the Moral Majority's agenda worthy of notice,
but those items should become the common concern of
all of us, and not be left to the tender mercies of tho e
whose anxieties and intensities outrun their wisdom.

••
••
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South African Pass Laws have been called .. the most vicious, unchristian system of human control
ever devised by man against man, excluding neither Nazi Germany nor Stalinist Russia."

Christians and South Africa
The Dilemmas of Responsible Choice

Arthur Keppel-Jones
How should Christians react to what is happening in
South Africa? This is a practical question, because in
many countries, including the United States, people are
regularly being asked to use their collective power to
influence public policies in this matter.
We are forced to make a choice. Churches, business
corporations, universities, and governments are asked
to withdraw any investments they may have in South
Africa, and to refrain from further investment. Governments are asked to reduce or cut off trade with that country, even to sever all communications, cultural contacts,
and other ties with it, to refuse to recognize South African passports, and to support U.N. resolutions in favor
of various sanctions and boycotts. It is open to individuals to practice their own boycott by refusing to buy
South African goods if any are available. Academic exchanges and sporting contacts can be prevented. We
can choose to support any of these measures by our personal decisions, by signing petitions, and by lobbying
our legislators.
Or we can choose the opposite course of tolerating, or

Arthur Keppel-Jones was born in South Afr£ca. From the
University of Cape Town he went, as a Rhodes Scholar, to
New College, Oxford. Returning to South Afn'ca he held
teaching posts in history in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, and in the University of Natal. In 1959
he emigrated with his family to Canada to become a professor
of history at Queen~ University, Kingston. Since emigrating
he has returned once, in 1972, for a visit to his native country.
He has traveled in the United States on a Carneg,:e travel
fellowship and has taught for brief periods at Duke University
and at the School of Advanced International Studies of the
Johns Hopkins University. In addition to numerous articles,
he has published several books on South African history and
politics: When Smuts Goes; Friends or Foes?; South
frica, A Short History; Thomas Philipps, 1820 ettler:
Hi Letters (edited); and (forthcoming) a major work entitled Rhodes and Rhodesia, The White Conquest of
Zimbabwe 1884-1902. F£nally, he is a committed Christian
and serves as a subdeacon £n the Anglican Church of Canada.
January, 1982

even promoting, any or all of these kinds of contact.
The first question that this problem provokes is: what
is all the fuss about? What have the rest of us got to do
with South African affairs? Why are we called upon to
make decisions about them?

A Catalog of Government Oppressions
It is easy to make a catalog of the oppressions, cruelties, and discriminations practiced by the South African
government against the black population. Its control
over their movements, activities, opportunities, employment, and rights to reside or be in any place has been so
extensive that the late Chief Albert Luthuli accused it
of "nationalizing the institution of slavery." The basis
of the institution is the Pass Laws; it is by means of his
"Pass," which every African must carry, that every aspect of his life is manipulated. A very representative
black leader, Dr. Ntatho Motlana, has called the Pass
Laws "the most vicious, unchristian system of human
control ever devised by man against man, excluding
neither Nazi Germany nor Stalinist Russia."
A recent example will illustrate the point. According
to the government's blueprint, the western Cape Province should be out of bounds to blacks; for curious historical and ideological reasons the field of non-white
labor in that region is reserved for the Colored (i.e.
mixed race) people. As economic force dictate otherwise, great numbers of blacks are admitted to the area
to meet the needs of employer , but their familie , if not
themselves employed, are excluded. Last July the police
combed through the black town hip of Langa and yanga on the outskirts of Cape Town and removed a
number of women and children who wer found living
with their husbands and fathers. The women erected
make hift huts in the neighb rhood. Th poli e mov d
in, exp lled the occupants, and burned the hu .
th
women and children huddled out ide in the cold and
rain (it wa the outh rn winter), whit ympathiz r ,
including cl rgy, arrived with food and blank
for th
ufferer . Th police barr d th way to them warned
photograph rs off, and fir d t ar a into th rowd. n
7

The list of oppressions is long, and it is not only blacks that are oppressed. The government
has a handy weapon in "banning," a sentence imposed by ministerial fiat, not by the courts.

due course the women and children were forced into
buses which took them about 800 miles and dumped
them in their so-called "homeland" of the Transkei.
There being neither jobs, food, nor husbands there, the
deported people began to return to Cape Town and
Square One.
This is just one example of what is called "endorsing
out." There are many ways in which an African can get
into trouble for being where his Pass does not allow him
to be, or for not being able to produce his Pass. In 1978,
275,000 people were arrested for offenses of this kind.
The list of oppressions is long, and it is not only
blacks that are oppressed. The government has a handy
weapon in "banning," a sentence imposed by ministerial
fiat, not by the courts. The terms of the banning order
vary; they always include a severe restriction of movement and a night curfew, and may include 24-hour
house arrest. They put severe restrictions on social contacts, such as not being able to be in the company of
more than one other person at a time, and never with
another banned person. (If husband and wife are both
banned, they require a permit to be able to communicate
with each other.) Those banned are visited regularly by
the police, or have to report to the police every day.
Nothing that a banned person says or writes, or has ever
said or written, may be published. For public purposes
he ceases to exist. This penalty is commonly imposed
on outspoken opponents of the regime. It is often used
as a means of intimidation, so that successive presidents
of the (in practice, though not in intention, white) National Union of South African Students, including the
p:resent one, have been banned.

Solving Problems with Bulldozers
There is a severe housing shortage. Some Colored
and Indian families have moved into available houses
or apartments in areas earmarked, under the Group
Areas Act, as white. This has happened with the approval of the property owners and the neighbors, but not of
the government. The problem is being "solved" by removals and by bulldozers.
It is the blacks, however, that suffer most, both from
the laws and from their administration by officials and
police. The death of Stephen Biko while under "interrogation" is only the most notorious of the police actions
of this type. As deaths and torture at the hands of the
police have increased, the laws prohibiting the publication of news or photographs of police action have become more comprehensive.
Education has long been racially segregated. Expenditure per white student in schools has averaged about
ten times the expenditure per black student. In 1980 the
8

teacher-student ratio in white schools was 1 :18.6; in
black schools 1:45.9. Teachers in black schools have
much lower qualifications than in white, and the control
of the central government over black education is pervasive. These are the facts behind successive riots and
"school boycotts" by children, and the ferocious reaction
of the government and its agents to them.
One could go on to other topics: detention without
trial, capital punishment (133 death sentences carried
out in 1979), press censorship, the far-reaching effects
of the Group Areas Act, the establishment of "homelands" as independent states (so that people with ethnic
roots in them, though actually living and working in
"white" South Africa, become aliens there), the continued imposition of "separate but (legally) unequal"
facilities in many spheres, racial discrimination in employment, and, underlying all, the white monopoly of
political power.
The list could be greatly extended, and the items described in more detail. But for the present purpose this
must suffice. The South African system is unchristian,
cruel, evil. There would seem to be a case for some action by the Christians of the world.
To such charges the government and its supporters
have two kinds of answer, or defense: (i) the government admits that there have been injustices, but it is
doing its best to remove them, and to abolish all discrimination and oppression; and (ii), why pick on South
Africa? Many other countries, and specifically most
countries of the Third World, have far worse records.
These two kinds of riposte deserve careful examination, and it would be unwise to decide on an appropriate
Christian attitude to South Africa without looking at
them closely.
There is a lot of evidence that conditions for some
Africans, in some respects, have improved in recent
years; and the same is true of the Colored and Indian
communities. The improvement is most obvious with
respect to employment opportunities and labor organizations. One of the first things to strike a visitor to
South Africa after an absence of ten or twenty years is
the number of jobs filled formerly by whites but now by
people of other colors. By one calculation, the average
real wage or salary of whites dropped by 6.2 per cent
between 1974 and 1978, while that of blacks rose by 23.3
per cent. (These figures must be seen in relation to the
wide gap between the starting points in the two cases.)
A beginning has been made (in 1980), by official approval of some black applications for apprentice hip,
of putting Africans on the track leading to regular qualifications in skilled trades. Since 1979 blacks ha e been
able to form regi tered (legally recognized) trade
unions, with the right to participate in the indu trial
conciliation system and to trike.
The Cresset

In a lurching fashion-two steps forward, one step back-South Africa is breaking down
the system of "petty apartheid" that has kept the races strictly segregated in the past.

In 1981, compulsory education for blacks was introduced in certain areas and was to be extended to the rest
of the country as facilities became available. For several
years white private schools have admitted a number of
non-white students, with or without official approval.
Now the right of private schools to do this has been
made legal; but the new law includes a threat, not spelt
out in detail, of closer government supervision and
control.
The most mind-boggling area of reform is what is
called "petty apartheid" - segregation in hotels, restaurants, clubs, buses, theaters, parks, beaches, and other
places of public resort. Not long ago racial segregation,
with few exceptions, was the rule in all such cases. Now,
in a lurching fashion-two steps forward, one step back
-it is being broken down piecemeal by permits granted
by the appropriate authorities. One of the reasons for
this is South Africa's need of diplomatic contacts. Some
of the diplomats coming to the country are not white,
and if these were subjected to the old-style segregation
practices the contacts would be short-lived. The white
South African public, however, is much more concerned
about international contacts in sport than in diplomacy.
So, in the same lurching fashion, racial segregation in
sports clubs and teams is crumbling. But it will have to
crumble much further before South Africa and New
Zealand can play rugby without causing a major international crisis.
Many more examples of improvements could be
given, but it is more important to look at these few examples, their implications and their limitations, in
perspective.
Changes such as these have been condemned as "cosmetic." They may look good to foreign visitors and they
remove a few unnecessary irritants, but, it is said, they
have not made the slightest dent in the real bulwarks
of white supremacy. These are the Pass Laws, the Group
Areas Act, the prohibition of interracial marriage and
extramarital relations, and, above all, the white monopoly of political power. The criticism i sound, except
that it makes no allowance for the concessions in the
area of job opportunities and trade unionism. However
re tricted these concessions may be, they have given to
the blacks a small instalment of power. What cau ed the
once sions to be made was economic necessity. outh
frica is a rapidly developing indu trial power. It i
ery rich in natural resource . It i rich al o in human
r ource , but because of the policy and tradition of
racial di crimination its future growth i now eriou ly
thr atened by a lack of killed manpower. The manpo er i there, but mo t of it ha b en denied ac e to
the kill. The bu ine communit puts tead pre ur
on th go ernment to mak up th hortfall b drawing
bla
into killed o cupations.
Janua , 1982

As I write these words, the press reports a meeting of
"about 600 top industrialists" with Prime Minister
Botha. They told him that "only in the field of industrial relations, where blacks have been allowed in the
past two years to form trade unions, has progress been
made." They now demanded that segregation and discrimination be broken down in "three other main sectors- mobility oflabor, black education with particular
reference to technical education, and housing." The
speakers at this meeting included "the heads of the
most powerful industrial and financial groups and a
number of black businessmen." The Prime Minister
showed no willingness to accede to these demands; but
he can be in no doubt that the alternative is an economic
crisis of catastrophic proportions.

Reform from Rapid Industrial Growth
At this point we pause to make a tentative judgment.
The cause of reform in the field of labor has been rapid
industrial growth. The prospect of continued growth
and prosperity if the further reforms suggested by the
business leaders are made, and of depression and collapse if they are not, forces these leaders to use all the
pressure they command to induce the government to
move in the direction they have indicated. If these reforms are made (in education, housing, and mobility),
pressure for change in other areas will certainly increase. More immediately, the economic condition of
the blacks will improve.
One little example will give some evidence of thi , as
well as of the effects of a combination of apartheid with
bureaucratic madness. The hortag of hou e for fricans in the whole country is counted in six figure . Like
every other area, the East Rand (the urban compl x
east of Johanne burg) faces this hortage. Local authorities there decided to take action. Buildin firm w re
willing and ready to build the hou e . h e mat rial
were availabl , and the upply of bla k building work r
was abundant. But the work r had to nter th ar a
authority conLaw -would

th
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The armed forces are overwhelmingly white. Military intervention by other African countries would
be futile. Experts calculate that South Africa could defeat any enemy except a Great Power.

no jobs for them in the "white area" they are "endorsed
out" -dumped in one of the "homelands" without work
or any means of living, but out of sight. The last people
to be unemployed are those who have votes. But this is
not the whole story.

Blacks Support Boycotts and Sanctions
Very many blacks, certainly the majority of those who
are politically active, argue that the withdrawal of foreign investments, trade boycotts, and even U .N. sanctions, are in their interest in the long run, however
tough the going may be in the short run. A leading
black trade unionist, Mrs. Lucy M vubela, went abroad
and argued the case for continued investment and trade.
Though she has impeccable credentials as a radical
leader, her fellows called her "Auntie Tom" when she
got home. The reasoning behind this attitude is that
things must get worse before they get better, that poverty and despair will create a climate favorable to revolution, and that revolution is the only means by which
the present wrongs can be put right.
This argument gives rise to these questions: (i) will
poverty and depression indeed lead to revolution, particularly in the fairly near future? (ii) is it true that revolution is the only or the best available way to solve the
problem? and, (iii) ought Christians to support the
revolutionary cause or to throw their weight on to the
side of some alternative?
On the first point, predicting a revolution is a very
risky form of prophecy. There are so many factors involved that the prophet, whatever he predicts, can easily
be mistaken. Without making a prediction either way,
we can consider some of the factors. Revolutions come
more often out of rising expectations than out of despair. (The very reforms that have been discussed here
are more likely than despair to provoke one.) Professor
Calvin Woodward of the University of New Brunswick
has pointed out that while the potential leaders of revolution in South Africa are based in the cities, their potential mass following is rural, that is to say in the
"homelands." The government's policy of making the
homelands independent attaches their peoples to a local
leadership opposed to the radical leadership of the
cities. Revolutionary leaders and their potential followers are being separated.
Revolution in the sense of a massive armed uprising
to overthrow the regime has almost always needed two
conditions if it is to succeed: a loss of confidence and
nerve by the regime and its supporters, and the help of
a significant part of the armed forces. There is no sign
of either of these conditions in South Africa. Hostile
moves or attitudes by other countries tend to exasperate
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most white South Africans and make them rally behind
their government. The armed forces are overwhelmingly white. Military intervention by other African countries would be futile. Experts calculate that in a military
sense South Africa could defeat any enemy except a
Great Power. And the hard core of the whites, that is to
say the Afrikaners, are very determined. They believe
that their domination is God's will. And they could not
preserve their national or cultural identity anywhere
outside South Africa.
"Revolution" in South Africa, if it occurs in the next
few decades, is unlikely to take the form of a mass uprising. It is more likely to be an escalation of what is
already happening: riots, boycotts, strikes, sabotage. In
the face of such attacks, will the government give way
and make concessions? Or will it, on the other hand, be
able to suppress this kind of hostility?
The answer to the second question is that it has been,
and for a long time probably will be, able to suppress a
particular riot by superior force, but it has not been able
to prevent this expression of hostility from breaking
out again and again in various places. Which brings us
back to the first question: will it achieve this by making
concessions? And that is linked to our next topic, is
revolution the only or the best solution to the problem?
At least on the surface, it appears that the problem
will not be solved either by revolution or by any other
means. That is to say, the government will not yield
either to force or to reasonable persuasion. The reason
for this is political in the narrowest sense.
The great political expression of Afrikaner nationalism and nationhood is the National Party, which has
been in power since 1948 and has been responsible for
the evils described earlier in this article. It has been
responsible also for the small and hesitant "reforms"
which have been discussed. These, and the slightly
liberal or compassionate sounds that some Nationalist
leaders were making as recently as a year ago, have
alarmed very many of their followers. These, the verkramptes, formed the very conservative right wing of
the party, opposed to the (relatively) "enlightened"
verligtes who supported some degree of reform in the
system of white supremacy. In 1969 the most extreme
verkramptes had even broken away from the party on the
ground that it had become too liberal, pink if not actually red. They had formed the Herstigte N asionale
Party (Re-founded National Party) or H.N.P.
At first this seemed to present no danger to the
government. H. .P. candidates got very few votes, not
because their ideas were unpopular but because they
had committed the sin of schism. The need for frikanerdom to preserve a united front was, for historical
reasons, deeply felt by most Nationalists. At ucce sive
elections, however, the H.N.P. steadily increased its
The Cresset

The necessary beginning, without which no change can occur, is to split the National
Party. There is not very much that foreigners can do about this, but there is a little.

vote, though not yet winning a seat. In the general election of April, 1981, it still failed to win a seat, but its
share of the vote quadrupled, so that it seemed to be
poised to make a breakthrough next time. The only way
the ruling Nationalists could defeat the H.N .P. was to
become as reactionary as possible. In Waterberg (northern Transvaal) the opposing candidates were Jaap Marais, leader of the H.N.P., and Dr. Treurnicht, leader of
the National Party in the Transvaal and the most conspicuous verkrampte in the whole party. Treurnicht won,
but a less reactionary candidate would have lost.
The gains made at the other end of the spectrum by
the Progressive Federal Party did not in themselves
worry the Nationalists, but they helped to bring the
latter's share of the popular vote down to 53 per cent. A
few more reforms, and a breakthrough by the H.N.P.,
might cause a stampede of right wing Nationalists into
that party. P. W. Botha and his verligte supporters
stopped their reformist talk at once. Police and bulldozers were let loose. The government had lost its room
for maneuver.

Divisions Among the Nationalists
All this means that the Prime Minister and those who
share what are supposed to be his "enlightened" views
value their own power and the unity of the party much
more than their enlightenment. A South African historian was right on the mark when he said that "my definition of a verligte is one who is prepared to split the
National Party." The present leaders are not prepared
to split it. But if it were to be split nevertheless, by factors beyond the control of the verligtes, these would
cease to have any reason to adapt their policies to verkrampte prejudices. This is not to say that they would
make major concessions to African demands; but they
might (with the support of what are now the opposition
parties on the liberal side) go some way to meet the
terms laid down by the businessmen. This would make
the political situation more fluid and make further
changes more likely.
This is a very uncertain answer to the question
whether revolution is the only or the best way to solve
the problem. It only suggests that in certain circumtances a more peaceful way may be opened up.
Christians in South Africa prefer that way if it is posible. All of the "English- peaking" churche (i.e. all
e cept the Dutch Reformed) are officially oppo ed to
the whole sy tern of apartheid. Many of their member
are weak-kneed about this but it i true to ay that the
cl rgy and the devout laity of tho e churches are firm
in their oppo ition to the whole
tern. Two of th
hurche the Methodi t (majorit of memb r black)
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and the Presbyterian (majority of members white) have
just been holding their annual conferences. The members of the Methodist Conference took an oath to bring
about "a free and just southern Africa" and denounced
apartheid as "the sinful work of the devil." They unanimously supported a resolution which included these
words:
God seeks a free South Africa, delivered from the violence of oppression, revolution, and war. We now declare to all South Africans that
there is a better way , where people who have discovered their love
for each other translate it into justice for all.

The Methodists evidently believe that non-violent
change is possible.
The new Moderator of the Presbyterian Church told
the General Assembly that "if we refuse to give up our
drive to dominate others, God will not defend us. . ..
He has a way forward for South Africa in which domination of one group by another ceases, because justice
towards each other has taken its place-justice rooted
deep and strong in God's law."
The General Assembly urged the clergy to disregard
government banning orders when preaching and when
circulating written material within the church-i.e., to
break the law by quoting the words of banned persons.
The clergy were also advised to disregard the Mixed
Marriages Act and to marry people of different races,
after warning them of the punishment the State could
inflict on them. (Clergy doing this would of course be
liable to penalties too).
The Anglican and Roman Catholic churches also have
good records in the fight against apartheid. In general,
the policy has been to seek and demand peaceful change
rather than revolution. And it must not be forgotten
that a courageous minority in the Dutch Reformed
churches has been speaking in the same vein. It is reasonable to suggest that Christians in the re t of the
world support that kind of struggle.
The necessary beginning, without which no change
can occur, is to split the National Party. Ther i not
very much that foreigners can do about thi , but th r i
a little. That party is now in th po ture hallowed by
Afrikaner tradition, standing hould r to houlder inside the laager (circle of wagon ) r ady to fight to the
last round again t the en my raging out id . Th obj t
of those who want p aceful chang hould be to p ruade the defender to br ak up the la.ager and ome
out to have a r laxed look at th world ou id . Th y
will do thi only if they f 1 that it i afe and that
thing can b gain d, by doing o.
The ationali t verligtes know p rf tl
ell that-in
the Prim Mini t r' own word - th on qu nc of
failing to reform will b 'too ha tly to ontemplat ."
t pr nt th y find th pr p t of lo in c ntrol of a
11

Again and again, the government's supporters, and even some of its opponents, repeat t he complaint
that world opinion gives South Africa no credit for any reform that it manages to achieve.

united Afrikanerdom even more ghastly. One of the
reasons for this- and it affects a large body of white
opinion-is that they see no advantage in giving up anything that they have because there is nothing they are
likely to gain in return. Most specifically, what they
seem unlikely to gain is the approval of world opinion.
Again and again the government's supporters, and
even some of its opponents, repeat the complaint that
the world gives them no credit for any reform that they
achieve. However much they concede, the world belittles it and emphasizes only what has not been done.
"Nothing will satisfy them but our giving up everything" has been the refrain.
Even if one thinks that the concessions made have been
only "cosmetic," and that little credit has been earned
yet, an insistence on all or nothing is bad political tactics. As every teacher knows, or ought to know, an occasional pat on the back is necessary for the training of
even the weakest student. But in this case there is a special factor which is even more important, a kind of encouragement that will do more than anything else to dissipate the herd instinct of the beleaguered Nationalists.
It concerns not South Africa itself, but other countries.
A standard defense of South Africa is to compare its
record with those of many other countries. Whether the
abuse in question is imprisonment without trial, solitary confinement, torture and police brutality generally,
restriction of the freedom of the press, denial of freedom of movement, illiteracy and lack of educational
opportunity, denial of political rights, violent suppression of public protests, a standard of living at or below
the starvation level, or almost any other of the evils for
which the South African government is responsible, it
can point to dozens of other countries with far worse
records.

The UN and Comparative Racism
In the early 1960s Ethiopia and Liberia (these states
taking the initiative because they had been members of
the former League of Nations) sought from the International Court a declaration, the effect of which would
have been to force South Africa to place its mandate for
South-West Africa (Namibia) under the trusteeship system of the United Nations. As it was discovered that the
original charge by the applicants would not stand up to
legal scrutiny, they shifted their ground. The final
charge against South Africa was that its policy in the
mandated (as in its own) territory was to "allot status,
rights, duties, privileges, or burdens on the basis of
membership of a group, class, or race rather than on the
basis of individual merit, capacity, or potential." This
was a very fair description, but the South African re-
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joinder was to show that the same policy prevailed in at
least 50 states and territories of the world, including
both the applicant states and 38 other members of the
United Nations.
Many of those countries were, and still are, guilty not
only of the abuses listed above, but specifically of discrimination against people because of their membership of a group, in some cases of a racial group.
This kind of comparison is being made every day in
South Africa. There is a world outcry because a dozen
people have been killed in that country, but the massacre
of thousands or tens of thousands in another country is
hardly noticed by the press.
There are two reasons why the world behaves towards
South Africa in this "unfair" way. The first is that the
oppression in that country is of black people by white.
The oppression of brown by yellow, or of a group of any
color by oppressors of the same color, is not seen in the
same light. Even discrimination by whites against
blacks is not condemned in the same way if it is a mere
abuse, not sanctioned by law. In South Africa that kind
of discrimination is openly sanctioned and enjoined by
the law itself. For that reason some have argued that the
South African case is sui generis.
That is a risky statement to make. In Northern Ireland a terrorist Catholic force, with bases in an adjacent
Catholic country, guns down members of a Protestant
majority in a territory which is legally a part of a neighboring, predominantly Protestant country; and Protestant terrorists reciprocate. Is there any other part of the
world where this situation is found? No; then the Northern Irish case is also sui generis. And one could put a lot
of other cases into that class. This is not a good reason
for picking on South Africa and leaving everyone else
alone.
The real reason for the passion generated by the
South African case is that for the last few centuries, of
all the suffering minorities or majorities in the world,
members of the black race have undoubtedly been the
most hurt. The real measure of this is less the suffering
of the body-slavery, the Middle Passage, poverty, unemployment, brutality, and the rest- than the suffering
of the black soul through humiliation. No other racial
group has been exposed to anything comparable with
the contempt directed at black people by whites, whether
in words, deeds, or mere facial expressions. ow that
this kind of thing seems to be coming to an end, the
flaunting of racial discrimination by South Africa ha
become a deeply felt insult. Hence the "picking on"
South Africa.
No Christian hould ever lo e sight of this a p ct of
the question. But if it is allowed to dictate our whole
policy, we may acrifice the end to the means. The end
i to get those last-ditcher to come out of the ditch, reThe Cresset

We should not adopt policies whose primary
purpose is simply to make us feel good.

lax, and allow freer rein to their feelings of humanity.
"Picking on" South Africa and disregarding the other
cases is one of the ways of convincing them that there is
nothing to be gained by compromising with prejudiced
and rigid opponents.
There is, in my opinion, a second reason for the passionate denunciation of South Africa, while a blind eye
is turned in all other directions. Unlike the first reason,
it is not a creditable one. In the course of a long life I
have seen many causes taken up in this unrestrained
fashion. There is, somewhere in the woodwork, a great
reserve of human beings whose main psychological
need is to make loud protests and demonstrations, to
vent their anger on somebody or something. For good
or bad reasons they climb on to the bandwagon that
happens to be passing by. The fashionable bandwagon
today is the anti-South African one.

Of Christian Options and Judgments
These allowances having been made, I would argue
that an attack on the evils in South Africa would have a
much greater impact on the people we would like to
influence if it were qualified by reference to other evil
regimes, by generous acknowledgement of even the
smallest signs of improvement, by showing understanding of the plight of the white minority (especially the
Afrikaners, who have nowhere else to go), and by recognizing that among the whites there are many who in
varying degrees oppose the evils that we all oppose.
Each church should keep up contact and dialogue
with its sister church in South Africa. This will be difficult for the Reformed Church, since there is a breach,
and some mutual hostility between the Dutch Reformed
Church in South Africa and the other Reformed
Churches of the world. But even in that case it must be
remembered that there is a brave Dutch Reformed
minority which needs contact and encouragement.
As for trade boycotts, sanctions, investments, and the
re t, I would argue that on these matters Christians
hould keep their options open. In the circumstances of
this moment, such boycotts and sanctions are probably
counter-productive. But South Africa must never for a
moment be allowed to forget that the world is waiting
for significant changes in its policy, and prolonged
foot-dragging might move us all do er to a position of
open hostility.
. The e attitude may help a little to break up the logJam. Thee ential point to remember i that we mu t not
lo e ight of the de irable end · means which will not
achie e tho e end are not to b adopt d merely beu e th y make u feel good.
Cl
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Ashes
1933
I've left Berlin.
But nightwet still
licks against my past.
I cannot read the morsecode
of the nightmoth's wing.
I cannot find
the cloistered hours
lined up each to each.
My arms, close to my sides
seem to polarize
East to West.
My head's weight,
tilted back and up
denies your fate.
I trust the rhythm
of my breath.
I need to think
that you live, but doubt
spills once again
into the inevitability
of evening.
Rudolf Wittenberg

Blackness Castle
Gaunt work-a-day fortress of barrack halls
and stores, chambers for wine and gunpowder,
chill inner rooms where the sergeants' whores
lay drafty in the blast from off the Forth
stout walls cannot keep out.
Bleak history of skirmishings in minor war ,
of treaties, accommodations made and broken,
changing hands, but never by the word.
No stomach-pinching sieges, eating vermin,
drinking blood. o gallant allie forth
to break the back of an attacker at a blow.
But the ice-floe howl of the Ea t wind
past the barren i land , the entrie 'hourly
grimace into the slobb ring mouth of the haar,
the far-near scouring of the tid , p rforming
their janitory dutie , providing th onl a ault
ever launch d again t tho e tark d f n
with their idl , aimle cann n-ball .
Blackne , your name hin dark and d adl
d ed that n v r am to b . Your fate
to know the tony drudg ry f
in a god-aban on d hol , b i
rn a
th cru I y ar of bor d m that it tak
to kill a cau , or cru h a ull n p pl
J. Barrie Shepherd
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Call No Man Happy ·
Before He Dies

1
'

Reflections on the Work Ethic

Forrest L. Vance

The title of these remarks is a proverb that had some
common currency in the Hebrew-speaking community
of Maccabean Israel. It is the subject of a short poem
composed by one Jesus hen Sirach and is included in the
book of his wisdom which we call Ecclesiasticus in most
English versions of the Old Testament Apocrypha.
A Hebrew text of most of this book was discovered in
Cairo in 1896, and fragments of it are among the Dead
Sea scrolls. However, prior to 1896, European language
translations were all made from Greek texts. The problems confronting a translator of such a book, even with
the original Hebrew available, are of course formidable.
Communicating the spirit of a work composed in remote
circumstances of language, time, and place requires constructive imagination as well as fidelity to the original
words.
This obscure poem is particularly important for our
understanding of the meaning of work in the contemporary world, because it was just here that the modern
concept of vocation was created, and invested with religious significance, by the deliberate phrasing of the
text by a translator with a definite viewpoint about this
matter. The passage involved is that recorded in Ecclesiasticus 11 :20-28, and the strong-minded translator was
Martin Luther.
In the New English Bible, the poem begins, "Stand by
your contract and give your mind to it; grow old at your
work. Do not envy a rogue his success; trust the Lord
and stick to your job." The King James Version of 1611
says, "Be steadfast in thy covenant, and be conversant
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therein, and waxe olde in thy worke. Marveile not at
the workes of sinners, but trust in the Lord, and abide
in thy labour."
According to Max Weber (1958, p. 79) our modern
concept of work as a "calling" was created by Luther,
when he first used the word "Beruf" (calling) in translating this text in Ecclesiasticus, "Bleibe in Gottes Wort
und iibe dich darin/und beharre in deinem Beruf und
las dich nicht irren/wie die Gottlosen nach Gut trachten.
Vertraue du Gott/und bleibe in deinem Beruf." (emphasis added). Weber says, "After that it speedily took on
its present meaning in the everyday speech of all Protestant peoples .... "

Luther, Weber, and the Work Ethic
It is hard to imagine that this obscure apochryphal
scripture passage, the first lines of a poem on a popular
Hebrew proverb of the second century, B.C. could have
been solely responsible for the sudden transformation
of the work-related attitudes and beliefs of the entire
body of sixteenth-century European Protestants. And
Weber, of course, suffered from no such delusion. In
three stupendous footnotes (Weber, 1958, pp. 204-211)
he reviews the documentary history of the passage in
Ecclesiasticus with comments indicating familiarity with
Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Dutch, Swedish, Spanish, and
Italian sources, plus indications of familiarity with additional material. He cites literature and informal communications with the most important of his contemporaries in philology and theology, and he traces Luther's
use of the word "Beruf" (calling) throughout the entire
text of Luther's translation of the Bible.
Weber e tablishes that Luther was systematically
using a revolutionary concept of human occupation in
his work as Bible translator. This revolutionary concept
wa rooted in Luther's relentless, voluminous published
attack on holy orders and monastici m. Hi no el ie,
of "calling" was al o publicly dramatized by hi own
career tran formation and by his marriage and famil
life. It i hardly urprising that Luther cho e Lutheran" alternative in tran lating the cripture " herever
hi ource documents p rmitted int rpreti e option .
The revolutionary a p ct of Luth r ' concept of ocation was th idea that
ryone i call d not ju t tho
The Cresset

There is little question that the forces of pulpit oratory, instruction in schools, and administration
of public and private enterprise have found the gospel of work-as-virtue to be satisfying doctrine.

with religious vocations. Thus, all callings are equally
valuable in the sight of God, and faithful work in one's
calling is a duty to the God of all callings. In Luther's
view, the cosmos of human callings is one way God's
love is expressed in the world, and work is also one of
the battlegrounds where God and Satan contend for
human souls. The full development of Luther's idea of
vocation is an immense task, but one that has been admirably begun by Gustav Wingren (1957) of Lund University, Sweden. Suffice it to say here that the idea of
what it means to work in a vocation was one of the
things that was decisively reformed by the Lutheran
Reformation.
Weber's "Protestant ethic" argued further that, going
beyond the Lutheran views, Calvinists came to believe
that faithful vocational performance could provide
assurance of salvation, that one was among the elect, an
idea that contributed greatly (says Weber) to the rise of
capitalism. Research and discussion concerning the
political, economic, and religious importance of the
"Protestant ethic" constitute a voluminous literature.
Weber's idea has been examined from the perspective
of religion (e.g., Tawney, 1926), politics (e.g., Walzer,
1976), and economics (e.g., Robertson, 1933); and also
studied from the psycho-historical viewpoint (Mitzman,
1969). However, few have quarreled with the idea that
the Reformation produced a fundamental change in the
meaning of work for the people of Protestant countries,
a meaning eventually embedded in most western
ideologies.
The idea that work is a religious-moral, that is, fundamental obligation is one solution to a pervasive human
problem, namely the universal experience of divergence between desires and obligations (cf. Pelz & Pelz,
1964). Few people have ever been blessed with a continuing congruence between the things they do to earn a
living and the things they do (or would do if they could)
for pleasure, or to give meaning to their lives.

skeptics, particularly with respect to some of the consequences of industrialization (cf. Ward, 1962; Marx,
1964). It is also clear that the idea that one's job is a divine calling has not been easy to sell to those workers
whose opportunities have been limited to callings that
combine low wages, long hours, and dangerous hard
physical labor. Collective bargaining has been a more
attractive repository of faith for such workers than the
consciences of the owners and managers of the enterprises in which they work.
Still, until quite recently, there has been very little
criticism of the core idea that hard work at any legitimate job is a virtue. The refusal of many workers to give
unswerving loyalty to their jobs and employers has
produced a whole secondary industry of personnel
management. As Loren Baritz (1960) has made abundantly clear, the social scientists, especially industrial
psychologists, who work in this field are "the servants
of power."
In an analysis of the origins and current status of the
ideology of work (Anthony, 1977, p. 5), the following
summary is given of the way in which personnel management is directed towards the problem of maintaining
commitment to the work ethic.
Dull and repetitive tasks are most frequently the target of the p rsonnel technician intent on job enlargement and job enrichment.
What is the purpose of this attention? Is it to promote the social and
psychological health of workers, or is it to make changes in work
which will at last make it conceivable to extend an ideology of work
to those most recalcitrant, or alienated-workers who have b en so
far exempted from its appeal by the patent absurdity of its application to their own jobs. A great deal of the ideology of work is directed
at getting men to take work eriously wh n they know that it i a
joke.

Work as Something to be Endured
The pre-Reformation solution to thi problem, in
Christian Europe, wa to regard all occupations as
equally unimportant and tainted by the fle h with the
e ception of religiou calling . Work, a all other earthI experience, wa to be endured a a part of one' preparation for heaven. In thi view, efforts to achie e
ealth and ucce s could mo t ea ily b under tood a
uccumbing to temptation of the de T
her i little qu tion that th force of pulpit orato
in truction in hool and admini tration of publi
nd pri ate enterpri ha found th o p 1 of ork-a ·irtu to be ati fying
h re ha al a b n
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If work-as-virtue

no longer seems meaningful, how can a worker resolve the split between
what he or she is required to do to make a living and the things that make life w orth w hile?

ment: the young, the old, the indigent, and spouses who
keep houses. These roles can be construed as employ-_
ment, and there are in fact ways that one can quit or be
fired as a spouse, child, parent, or indigent. Services
and hiring practices also exist for these roles.
Perhaps it is even more instructive to note that many
cultures have not considered work to be virtue, but an
evil activity not suitable for citizens. Classical Greece
was such a society, and Plato's ideal republic, as a matter
of course, depended upon slaves to carry out the material tasks necessary for its existence. Ancient Rome,
Babylonia, Egypt, and many more recent societies have
considered some or almost all work unfit for citizens.
Neither the plantations of the United States nor the
pyramids of Egypt were built by student volunteers.

Moving from Work t o Citizenship
Mechanization, rather than slavery, is the potential
resource that could permit a modern society to develop
a system in which citizenship is a full-time occupation,
or nearly full-time occupation, for the largest part of the
population. Some small countries with a commitment to
social democracy, and a high level of technical development, may be moving in this direction.
Sweden is a particularly interesting example of such
a trend. Following his earlier book on Sweden (Childs,
1936), Marquis Childs has written a follow-up study
(Childs, 1980) which suggests that this small nation is
continuing to distribute income without great variations
related to traditional correlates of pay such as seniority
or skill. The recent Swedish political swing to the right,
according to Childs, was largely a reaction to a plan
(the Meidner plan) for appropriating 20 per cent of corporate profits for the sole use of the Swedish labor organization as it saw fit. Even the Swedes found this a bit
much. The fact that such a plan could be proposed with
a real chance of acceptance is in breathtaking contrast to
the political possibilities in most industrialized countries.
In any case, one way work can become less important,
without damage to people's lives, is for less of it to be
needed and done. For those who must work, or want to,
the question of meaning in work would, of course, still
remain. So, if work-as-virtue does not continue to be a
viable source of meaning, what other possibilities exist?
How can a modern worker resolve the split between
what he or she is required to do to make a living and the
things that make life worthwhile?
To begin with, this is a sensible question only for people who do in fact believe that there are possible circumstances in which their lives could be meaningful. For
such people, alienation from one's work might be reduced by changes in the work itself (job enrichment in
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the current jargon) and by finding connections between
work and matters of "ultimate concern" in Paul Tillich's
phrase (cf. Tillich, 1951, pp. 11-15). But if a person becomes alienated from the human community, from life
itself, no alternative sources of value exist to be integrated into one's work; one has no ultimate concerns.
Even psychologists understand that a meaningful
existence, in the sense of commitment rather than alienation, can only be erected on a foundation of basic trust
(cf. Erikson, 1950, pp. 247-248). Perhaps it is best not to
press too closely just yet for a complete answer to the
question of what is the ultimate object of our basic trust,
but Erik Erikson (1968, pp. 105-107) says plainly that the
institutional expression of basic trust is religion. The
evaluation we make of our lives as meaningful or meaningless depends, in large part, on whether, in the midst
of our finite and imperfect existence, we adopt a posture
of trust or mistrust in what has brought us into that
existence, what Tillich describes as "that which determines our being or nonbeing." (Tillich, 1951, loc. cit.)
Tillich is particularly helpful because he is able to cut
away all distracting metaphysical considerations and
show that vital theological-religious issues continue to
confront us whether we choose to respond to them in
some traditional mode or not. His is a theology fitting
for what is commonly regarded as a post-supernatural,
or at least a post-dogmatic age. Rooted in historical
Christianity, Tillich's work is a possible bridge between
Christian faith and the truly ecumenical human enterprise of coping with existential anxiety.
H. Richard Niebuhr (1963, p. 119) described the situation from a similar point of view in this way:
Our primordial interpretation of this radical action by which we are
is made in faith as trust or distrust. Between these two there seems
to be no middle term. The inscrutable power by which we are is
either for us or against us . If it is neutral , heedless of the affirmations
or denials of the creatures by each other, it is against us , to be distrusted as profoundly as if it were actively inimical. For then it has
cast us into being as aliens , as beings that do not fit.

Niebuhr's book, The Responsible Self, is concerned with
what is a fitting and appropriate, "responsible," life. He
argues that responsible living entails an explicit or implicit decision to trust the process that has brought us
into being, and without such trust it is impossible to
undertake any occupational or social activity with a conviction that one's behavior is truly fitting, suitable, "responsible." The quotation marks around "responsible"
indicate Niebuhr's special conception of the term as a
kind of dialectical attitude in which one's humanism is
indicated by the disposition to answer for one's thought
and actions and to press for further questions.
The theological assimilation of contemporary ps chological notions i reflected in the way that the idea of
"work as virtuous obedience to God" is reinterpreted b
The Cresset

Some degree of disillusionment concerning the moral value of our work is probably inevitable for
all of us, and we then must try to find realistic ways to reinterpret our occupational experience.

Tillich and Niebuhr to mean something like "work as
responsible commitment in basic trust." The beauty of
this change is that it can be done with total intellectual
honesty, managing to maintain the integrity of the theological perspective, without going beyond the empirically-determinable facts of human existence for premises.
However, such a reformulation certainly lacks much of
the moral and rhetorical force of the original version of
the Protestant ethic. Something less desiccated is going
to be wanted by most working people if the ideology of
work is to be restored as a vital impulse to faithful job
performance.
The crumbling of the Protestant ethic as a foundation
for the meaning of work, if that is what is happening
(and I believe it is), marks a major turning point in our
culture. Like the fall of Rome, this is not a brief or simple affair. As a major stabilizing force disintegrates, various constituencies arise to prop up the tottering structure, or to hasten the collapse, or to establish alternatives. If some new stability is to be achieved, its form is
not clearly discernible in the scattered shadows it casts
before it as it comes. And it is not likely to arrive next
week.

Finding New Sources to Justify Work
Those of us who are able to hold on to the ideology of
work-as-virtue will be annoyed and vaguely troubled by
those of us who find that view no longer credible. Also,
those of us who can carry on our occupational lives
under the influence of some new alternative vision may
be able to keep a reasonably steady grip on our workbased self-esteem. But those of us who start our working
lives with a belief that work is a moral good and then
come to find that idea incredible in the very process of
erecting a lifestyle upon it are vulnerable to the full
shock of losing the major source of our self-approval.
Some degree of disillusionment concerning the moral
value of our work is probably inevitable for all of us,
and we then must try to find realistic ways to reinterpret
our occupational experience. If commitments to work
can no longer be justified by connections to one's assurance of salvation or by contributing to one's moral selfapproval, perhaps other important values can be shown
to be relevant.
In America, since the end of World War II, there has
been a considerable literature on self-fulfillment or selfactualization as a value, and one to which occupational
achievement might reasonabl be expected to make a
major contribution. Americans have at times seemed to
have had a nearly my tical belief in 'the right job" a the
key to life atisfaction. Among p ychologists, Donald
uper (1951) captured the en e of thi popular notion
in a th ory and re earch program that defined oca]anua
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tional adjustment as implementing one's self-concept in
a developmental sequence of occupations. Growth to
full potential-self-realization-is the key to satisfaction.
To be sure, many people are not able to enter occupations that do much for their self-concepts. Still, like the
vision of the Holy Grail, the dream of self-actualizing
employment is a spur to the heroic ambition of many a
person for whom work as ethical require1!1ent has no
meaning.
Empirically, it has been apparent for some time that
the relationships among occupational performance,
occupational satisfaction, and life satisfaction are modest. An extensive review of the job satisfaction literature
(Locke, 1976) discovered that over 3,300 studies of job
satisfaction had been published. The Locke review mentions only Kornhauser's (1965) classic study of mental
health in industry and two journal articles as indicating
significant correlations between attitudes towards the
job and attitudes towards life. Of course the direction of
causal influences is uncertain in these relationships, as
the authors recognize. It seems probable that job attitudes are as much determined by more general life
attitudes as the reverse. And one respectable study (London, et al., 1977) has reported that positive effects of
job and avocational activities on life satisfaction are
limited to white, middle-class, male workers.
The idea of work as a ready route to self-actualization
may well be a light that fails rather quickly. It is true
that there have been rapid changes in American laws
and customs tending to reduce discrimination based on
sex, race, and age. These changes have certainly created
realistically-larger career hopes and expectations for
many of us. The past two decades have brought about a
revolution of norms, and it may be fair to say a revolution of consciousness as well, with respect to occupational opportunity. Young women and minority workers do indeed have increased access to occupations heretofore dominated by white male , usually older. However, the young person (of whatever ex or race) b nt on
self-fulfillment through a career quickly learn that
many jobs require almost total involv ment if one i to
succeed, so elf-fulfillment is po ible only if the job
requirements completely d fin th fulfillment being
sought. The most alient characteri ti of the older white
males who dominate the upper 1 I of managem nt
and the high-pay profe ion may w 11 b th ir unregenerate devotion to th work thi .
There are v ry few p opl (and probabl ad dining
numb r) for whom work alon i a ompl t 1 ati fying
an wer to th qu tion, "Who am I?' For thi r a on
alone, it would e m n ibl to n i er a ti 1tI p rform d for incom a on ptuall
parat from a tiv1tI p rform d to giv m
lif
h r for
in th r tof thi pap r ,
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Our occupations will continue to provide the necessities of life and some meaning, while
avocational activities will be directed towards the more complete fulfillment of vocation.

will be called occupations, and social roles that give
meaning to life will be called vocations. With this vocabulary I would now like to discuss some of the implica~
tions of variation in the extent of overlap between occupation and vocation.
Much of the earlier discussion is simplified by separating the concepts of vocation and occupation in this
way. Vocation, then, is what is impossible without basi~
trust, while work as self-actualization is then a faith that
nearly complete overlap between vocation and occupation is possible and desirable; and the Protestant ethic is
a statement that, for the person of faith, occupation,
whatever it may be, is vocation.

Separating Occupation from Vocation
This separation of terms is not an entirely new view,
even among psychologists. C. G. Wrenn (1964) used
much the same distinction in a fine article on work and
values. The distinction is also implicit in the entire literature on job satisfaction and work motivation. It simply
hasn't been crisply defined and given emphasis as a central idea in understanding individual, group, and cultural variations in work beliefs and attitudes.
The Protestant ethic and the self-actualization motive
each provide a way to increase both a personal and a
cultural sense of occupational-vocational congruence.
However, doubts based on theory and/or experience
suggest that almost all of us experience significant ideological and personal discomfort based on evident divergences between occupational necessities and vocational
longings. Some kind of tolerable balance or compromise
will probably be achieved by most of us as individuals.
Our occupations will provide the necessities of life and
some meaning, while avocational activities will be directed towards the more complete fulfillment of vocation. We will be "work-adjusted" rather than satisfied
or fulfilled by our jobs, and we will try to keep our jobs
from getting in the way of those activities that give our
lives a true sense of response to a calling.
The value implicit in this idea of a "balance" of activities is mental health or personal adjustment. It probably represents the dominant emerging attitude of postindustrial, post-ideological, post-dogmatic western societies. While such a view (personal health as a dominant value) has considerable appeal both for individual
planning and for policy development, it is neither perfectly clear what is meant by this idea, nor can we predict the social and cultural consequences if such a value
were to become dominant. There is certain! y reason for
discomfort about the style of future personal and community life in our society if what is developing is a form
of narcissism, as Christopher Lasch (1978) has argued.
Furthermore, there is room for doubt about the possibil-
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ities of healthy balance for most working people. Many
occupations are not merely non-vocational (meaningless), but counter-vocational (absurd), and there are
work-related structural characteristics of society that
hinder the pursuit of meaning for most people.
The specialized division of labor in our successful
industrialized democracy, with associated geographic
and social mobility, plus our cultural diversity, have
produced in America a remarkable specialization of
personal relationships as well. We work with one set of
people, worship with another set, have still others as
neighbors, may share our recreational life with others,
and frequently have our relatives scat!-ered throughout
the entire country, except for those in our immediate
household (who more and more frequently are temporary companions). Put another way, our society is one
in which we have very few relationships that involve us
with each other in more than one or two dimensions of
our existence. Many of us have a few close friends with
whom we have shared a great deal, but these friends
are commonly not currently even in the same community. Many of us maintain what multidimensional intimacy we have by mail, long-distance telephone calls,
and sporadic visits.
The energy we invest in maintaining our intimate
friendships is evidence of their importance in our efforts to find meaning in our lives. Vocational efforts are
often kept alive by the support of friends, and friendship is certainly vital for mental health, but we are organized as a society to make it difficult to become deeply
interested in one another at all, and difficult also to keep
in touch with each other once we have formed bonds of
significant mutual attachment.
This is perhaps not a universal experience, but for
many Americans it is a reasonably realistic description
of the facts of everyday life. People living in countries
that are smaller, more culturally homogeneous, and
perhaps less socially-mobile may find it easier to move
towards an ideal of "healthy balance" as a workable
ideology of work. Even given these changes, a tradition
of mutual concern and self-disclosure would also be
needed if the result is not to be a safe, comfortable, but
utterly boring society.
These last sorts of issues can be studied most profitably by cross-cultural investigations. We need to spend
more time getting an understanding of how attitudes
towards work are changing in countries that don 't have
the same structural problems of society as the United
States. Japan, the Scandinavian Countries Britain
France, and Germany- all have fewer of the problem
of geographic size and cultural diversity that contribute
to the problem of work attitude in this country. The
variety of customs regarding family , friendship and
intimacy is of course very great, and the influence of
The Cresset
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and dissatisfied than those in the past, perhaps it is because we have fewer illusions.

these patterns on work attitudes is profound. But that is
a topic for another time.
What can be said here is that cultural change, like the
growth, aging, and changing behavior of individuals , is
not subject to objective analysis by those directly involved. As our title suggests, a final evaluation cannot
be made during life. It is a post-mortem affair. Perhaps
only dead cultures can be truly appreciated , even
though the one we live in is the one we most need to
understand, if only partially and provisionally.
It is my impression that cultural change in our society
is more often experienced as loss than gain, at least in
the midst of the action. The losses are obvious, the gains
less certain. Perhaps this accounts for the mournful tone
of much literary and historical reflection on changing
times. Matthew Arnold listening to the "melancholy,
long, withdrawing roar" of the "sea of faith," and Wordsworth's crying out that he would "rather be a pagan,
suckled in a creed outworn" than be caught up in the
life of a man of affairs both express this mood. Spengler's Decline of the West is a wonderful example of a version of this idea that seemingly cannot be killed by refutation.

The Attractions of Innocence
Our literary tradition also fosters a romantic view of
childhood, and a distrust of maturity. The loss of innocence is often described in tragic terms. Wordsworth is
again a fine example of this tendency. In his ode entitled "Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of
Early Childhood," he says:
Heaven lies about us in our infancy;
Shades of the prison house begin to close
Upon the growing boy ,
But he beholds the light, and whence it flows
He sees it in his joy;
The youth , who daily farther from the east
Must travel. still is Nature's priest,
And by the vision splendid
Is on his way attended ;
At length the man perceives it die away,
And fade into the light of common day.

Disillusionment, to be ure, is a fundamental process
of our personal and cultural development. But the loss
of anta Claus, the tooth fairy , the obstetric tork, and
even the Protestant ethic may al o be construed a progre , a education. Disillusionment may not be often depicted as a positive proce by poets, but there i certainI a ca e to be made for the po itive value of th painful
change that can only come by giving up what i no
longer credible.
o if our modern attitud toward our work are more
keptical tentative, non ommittal u p1c1ou and di ati fi d than tho e in th past perhap it i b cau
e
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have fewer illusions; and because we are very much
alive, and not ready to die in order to be called happy.
It remains to be seen whether a new economic-ethical
synthesis can be achieved which will allow us to be alive,
without illusions, and happy all at the same time.
Cl
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Voluntarism Revisited
The Personal, Humane Response Still Matters

Lois Reiner
Eight years ago I wrote an article for The Cresset
("Voluntarism: Salve or Solution?," January, 1974)
attacking voluntarism. I've changed my mind.
The banner reading CHANGE still tilts from my hall
closet. Reminders of our local community's efforts in the
area of low-cost housing for minority families are still
alive and expanding. Currently, however, I'm convinced that it's the little acts of social kindness that most
need encouraging. Once I pooh-poohed traditional
approaches to delivering human services as always
salve, seldom solution. Now I'm discovering that salve
might possibly provide our last connection with the humane response to human suffering in a society whose
responses, when they occur at all, tend to the technological.
Take, for instance, The Global 2000 Report to the President. Its scary predictions regarding world conditions
focus on overpopulation and shrinking food supplies,
deadly pollution, and a widening gap between those
who feast and those who starve as a "threat to the future
welfare of humankind." Undoubtedly the fact-finders
are correct in mandating the creation of "a mechanism
for continuous review" and "prompt and vigorous
changes in public policy around the world."
Nevertheless, they skipped a beat. Equally vital to
stemming catastrophic trends is a commitment to the
humane response, individually and corporately. Technical solutions to largely technologically-created problems only scratch the surface. It's what we might call
problems of the heart that require scrutiny. Revised
public policy might clear our air and bolster agricultural output, but it can't do much about alleviating certain kinds of pain, loneliness, and humiliation.
Voluntarism, I contend, can.
Eight year~ ago, I blush to admit, I surveyed the work
of voluntary activity and diminished it by suggesting
that tender ministerings were not enough. Perhaps I
was only responding to particular circumstances: it was
primarily women who constituted the armies dedicated
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to unsalaried succoring. Women, not men, flooded the
wards, emergency rooms, cells, and seedy halls with
their healing energies. So women, I thought, were perpetuating the myth that they could forever be counted
upon only to bandage up the little wounds. All that energy, all that expenditure of creative compassion could be
applied to enacting CHANGE, I trumpeted. Allow me
to eat those words. I wrote them when husbands were
still promising their friends that "No wife of mine will
ever WORK!"
That was another milieu. Today's is shot through with
new imperatives. Inflation, for one, is dictating a revised
version of free time usage, and women have begun toppling from their adorable pedestals to join men in the
work place. Today we're ripe for competing equally,
freed from the old indoctrination, able to know our full
potential. Hurrah! and Boo! I say in the same breath.
Hurrah! if we recognize the price to be paid. Boo! if we
don't. If both men and women are, more and more,
commuting to the work place (even second work places),
who's left to take on the wards, cells, emergency rooms,
and seedy halls anymore? Who has the time? The
energy?
Well, we sigh, thank heavens for the professionals
and their parent agencies. The emotionally-, physically-, and otherwise-handicapped can still count on them
at least. True. On the other hand, what will happen to
us when we have fewer and fewer opportunities to
soothe, to sacrifice, to act out what our hearts plead is
necessary for sustaining humaneness? Now that we have
shattered the old stereotypes which had been too long
unchallenged, women as well as men are throwing their
main energies into performing for pay. Now we can all
take on equally the tensions of our technically-perfectible times.
Could we, however, pause for just a moment in our
self-congratulations? Just long enough to listen for the
possible sound of aortae clogging?
With free time becoming almost non-existent, we invest what little we have, it seems, in self-help activities.
A whole new brand of voluntarism, in fact, is catching
on across the land, according to a recent surve conducted by Bruce Stokes in the Christian Science Monitor.
"The new volunteers: not what Mr. Reagan had in
mind" are comprised of millions of Americans who now
use free time to perform do-it-yourself home renovaThe Cresset

tions, plant-weed-harvest family gardens, and manifest
dietary and exercise changes in their daily lives. President Reagan would like to see these efforts expanded to
benefit the entire community. We should only like to
see them labelled as necessary as we get back to what is
needful.
What is needful requires a bit of a struggle to define.
I'd like to suggest it has to do with commodities not
marketable, but negotiable nevertheless. The struggle
comes, actually, in keeping our "commodities" of creativity, spontaneity, and compassion from getting lost
sight of in the fight against inflation, in the battle to become expert, in the myriad pressures of our public
lives. There is, of course, the chance that someone reading this enjoys the good fortune of operating from an
arena that specializes in hiring the creative, spontaneous, and compassionate. There are always the exceptions. For the rest of us, finding opportunities for keeping those qualities alive is after-5:00 p .m. stuff-if we
have the energy, if we realize the need.
Let's say we do. Or that the option comes our way.
How would we respond-and with what? And in what
sense are our response-commodities "negotiable"?
Last summer I had the option and responded. There
were the old commodities, just when I thought they'd
rusted over for the season. And compassion, I found,
still has negotiable valuP when exchanged, however
imperfectly, for pain, loneliness, and humiliation. She
was the prisoner; I was the volunteer. By the time I'd
made my third visit to Porter County Jail's women's
cell block, a passage from Claude Brown's Manchild i"n
the Promi"sed Land made such sense about "needful." Referring to the Vassar coeds who volunteered to visit inmates ofWiltwyck School for Boys, Brown wrote, "They
were some of the nicest girls I had ever met, and some
of them knew some things too. You could talk to them
and they could understand things."
The point is, there are some "things" we know that
are no longer necessary, but are still desperately needful. Those "things" don't fit the efficient and orderly
world in which we ply expertise. Indeed, they would
only get in the way between 8:00 and 5:00, and would
probably ruin our chances for promotion should we
attempt to activate them on the job. But they're there,
tugging and unclogging. Obviously it's simplistic to
say you-too-can-be-nice. Who wants to be merely nice
when the going market is for the cool-headed and the
credentialed? Still, rewards can surface in the transaction.
St. Paul says it more exactly:
Of course, I don't mean that others should be relieved to the extent
that leaves you in distress. It is a matter of share and share alike. At
present your plenty should supply their need, and then at some future
date their plenty may supply your need.

He was not talking about charity, which is one-way, n onreciprocal. When we are involved in supply-and-demand of this variety, we are responding humanely- we
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are affirming humaneness on both sides of the venture.
How can we understand our humane capacities unless
someone, and rather consistently, provides us with the
opportunity to put them into motion? And vice versa.
What it boils down to-this idea of keeping the humane response from atrophying-is convincing ourselves that we also know some things that are vital to
"the future of humankind." Perhaps our necessary preoccupation with the economy and environment muffles
the conviction, but the head and the heart are at stake.
Those maligned volunteers in my long-ago piece
understood that; and to them I say thanks-. Better late
than never. Hurrah for the chance to haul out the enlivening commodities after another pressurized day on
the ladder. They may be applied as salve, but in the
process we remember certain things that open certain
doors where someone waits who might eventually write,
" ... and he or she could understand things."
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Cardoness Castle
And that's the murder hole, h e said,
above the yett. The boiling lead
would fall like rain.
And those who were not dead
would end up in the pit.
This is it.
Black, jagged drain
for broken bones
and half-cooked brain
within the rubble wall. The moans
would float like music sweet
to the lord and his lady
at their meat.
The greasy scullions
on their climb
from kitchen to the banqu et hall
would take a little time
to rest their load
against the wall
right h ere.
H e touched a tiny hole
that led through rock into the pit
and grinned, not air
at all, you see,
but streaming waft of food would pa
like haft from H 11
to broken oul ,
starving within th w 11.
nd this i it.
The en my aid h
i alway with u .
J. Barrie Shep herd
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Three Mile Island as the War of the Worlds
Popular Representation
Of Crisis
James Combs

"What lessons have been learned from the accident at
Three Mile Island?" asks a Congressional report on the
event. "The most fundamental lesson of TMI," they con-.
elude in a masterpiece of understatement, " ... is that
accidents can happen." Such a conclusion is undoubtedly cold comfort to the approximately 650,000 people
who live in the general area of that unfortunate plant,
some of whom experienced severe reactions, both immediately and in the long run, because of the fears
which proximity to the plant generated.
But, we also learn from the report, those fears were
largely unfounded, a "public misconception" that was
the fault of the mass media. The "confusion and mental
stress" that local residents suffered can be traced to the
exaggeration by the media of the risks involved in the
incident. The report cites Mrs. Trunk, the Kemeny
Commission member who was a local resident: "Too
much emphasis was placed (in the media) on the 'what
if' rather than the 'what is.' As a result the public was
pulled into a state of terror, of psychological stress.
More so than any other normal source of news, the evening national news reports by the major networks
proved to be the most depressing, the most terrifying."1
Even though the Kemeny Commission thought the
media generally "balanced" in their reporting of the
accid~nt, it did score them for examples of "irresponsible reporting," "sensational" visual images, and lack
of technical expertise, which "resulted in the public
being poorly served.'"2
The author has argued elsewhere that national television, depending on which network one talks about,
did not always report the accident as charged. 3 The
networks' coverage of TMI was at least in part a function
of their respective organizational traditions, current
1

"Nuclear Powerplant Safety after Three Mile Island," prepared for
the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of Representatives (March , 1980 ), pp. 7, 24-2 5.

2

Summary of the Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (October, 1979), p . 21.

3

James Combs and Dan immo, " The Return of Frankenstein: The
Popular Media Aesthetic of Three Mile Island Coverage by ABC Evening ews ," Studies in Popular Culture, IV ( pring, 1981 ), 38-4 8.

James Combs teaches Poli'tical Science at Valparaiso University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the
annual meeting of the Popular Culture Association in Cincinnati in spring, 1981.
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managerial decisions, reportorial styles, and perceived
audiences. In its coverage, CBS tended toward the informational style, with the melodrama of TMI defined
as reponsible elites versus a nasty but manageable problem, in the manner of "disaster averted" stories (e.g.,
forest fires, dams threatening to break). NBC was more
feature-and-education oriented, telling the story as if it
were a panoramic Big Event in which we all learn how a
nuclear plant works and how we should think on the
question of nuclear power. For ABC the accident was the
Frankenstein monster story, with the new Frankenstein
fooling around with Mother Nature in his Castle on the
Susquehanna, creating a monster which then gets loose
and terrorizes the peasants in the surrounding villages. 4

A Story Whose Time Had Arrived
Yet whatever the variations in style, all the medianetworks, newspapers, newsmagazines-were drawn to
the TMI story and covered it heavily. Why? For one
thing, it was a story whose time had arrived. The China
Syndrome had just been released. The anti-nuclear
movement was getting publicity, and some prominent
politicians had expressed 9-oubt about the safety of nuclear plants. Too, the accident occurred in a heavily
populated area, close to media centers and easy for the
press to get to. 5
But most of all , TMI was a "good story"-a highlytechnological event involving a variety of dramatic
options. Even the most "responsible" and restrained
news organizations gave dramatic urgency to the story.
Walter Cronkite led into the story on Friday, March 30,
1979, with the claim that 'the world has never known a
day quite like today," and the magisterial New York
Times headlined: "U.S. Aides See a Risk of Meltdown at
Pennsylvania Nuclear Plant: More Radioactive Gas is
Released. " The story had features of what has
been called the 'melodramatic imperative": plot twi t ;
in ten ified peril · the intervention of outside forces·
hero villains, and fools· a tory narrative that includes
climax, peripety, and denouement. 6 It offered the pre
melodramatic option : adventure, my tery romance
4

Ibid.

5

the wide-rangi n article b Peter M. and man and ary Paden.
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6
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Three Mile Island was an important story for many reasons, including the fact that it was a
popular representation of a mass fantasy that has long existed in advanced industrial society.

nightmare. They could "play" the story in a variety of
ways for a variety of audiences, but with the assurance
that their mass audience would see the drama in the story.
Our argument here, then, is that TMI was an important story for many reasons, but certainly including the
fact that it was a latter-day popular representation of a
mass fantasy that has been with advanced industrial
societies for a long time: the fear that some powerful
force, armed with technological power, will intrude
upon and even destroy our lives. Either intentionally
or by accident, goes the fantasy, something will be
loosed which will disrupt the fabric of ordinary life.
We are already aware of the use of technology for war,
death camps, and behavior modification. We have, in
addition, daily reminders of the intrusion and ill effects of the automobile, pop music, TV, drugs, etc. It is
not surprising, accordingly, that one of the recurrent
themes in popular culture involves technological
threats. The mass uneasiness about the impact of technology contributes to the enduring popularity of the
Frankenstein fable, science-fiction, tales of mad scientists (e.g., cloning Hitler in South America), technicallyproficient conspiracies (Sl?ECTRE), and so forth. Since
technology has been used for evil, popular culture
becomes a play-world in which we can experience that
evil. We can "identify" the tale because it is part of our
consciousness of modem life.
So too can the news media. A technological fable is
a good story because it represents an identifiable anxiety
in modern consciousness. A story such as Three Mile
Island becomes a mythic representation of a more diffuse and latent mass fantasy about the danger of rampant
technological development. TMI is part of a "tradition
of fright" which popularizes in various forms our
standing fear that a nightmare will come in technological armor. The news media, however they played the
incident, managed to sense and include this element of
the story. Thus, however diver e the coverage, they
were all covering it with that tradition in their-and
our-background.
The Frankenstein fable is one of the root myths in
this tradition. Technology i utilized to create something powerful that i then loo ed on an unwary population which must flee before it on laught. Unle we
have a technology equal to the threat, or omething
unfore een happens, the threat remain . The Frankentein mon ter cannot be killed and a movie buff know
i endle ly revived for yet more de truction.
Thi formula ha had man
ariation but the basic
featur remain con tant. Think for e ample, of th
War of the Worlds radio broadc t in 193 . Th fir t
part of Or on Welle famous pani broadca t u d a
fi tional tale in a n
format
ith 'r p rter int rvi wing p pie and t llin of fl in au r and ar]anua
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tians. But the story still belongs in the technological
fable tradition. The Martians are an anonymous inhuman
force, an army-of Frankenstein monsters, armed with a
technology they use to take over the earth. People panicked and fled before their onslaught, both in the show
and among some few of the listeners to the broadcast. 7
Similar technological fantasy is also evident in such
genres as 1950s science fiction movies and Jap_anese monster films. Sometimes in such films the technological
power is deliberately unleashed, designed to invade and
dehumanize ordinary American life, just as (according
to the Cold War mind of the fifties) the Communists
want to do. The sci-fi movie simply "displace "
the political aspect of the fantasy to outer space. 8 At
other times, like the Frankenstein monster, the force
unleashed is simply a technological creation that gets
out of control. The fifties films, for example, pre ented
us with rabbits, ants, and other creatures suddenly made
gigantic and aggressive by the mysterious force of nuclear radiation. The Japanese films also often involv d
the transforming power of nuclear energy, although at
least one included as well a monster created by smog.

Nuclear Energy and Mass Anxiety
Indeed, by the fifties the proliferation of nucl ar
weapons had become a central part of ma anxiety,
since nuclear energy, the new technological power,
made us think about the unthinkable. In th 1970 , th
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The media logic at work at Three Mile Island means that whatever the .. reality" of an event, the
definition of the event by the media as a representational story tends itself to define the story.

<lensed and transformed into a format and story line
recognizable both to the media organization and to
media consumers. The heritage of the technological
fable, translated into media logic, means that the story
must have features which "live up to" both media and
mass expectations about how the story is supposed to go.
In other words, media logic means that whatever the
"reality" of an event, the definition of the event by the
media as a representational story tends by itself to define
the story. Once the situation is defined, the media story
then takes on a form and content consistent with the
media definition. The news process may find, accept,
and magnify "facts" which are consistent with the media
logic of the story.9

The Logic of Mass Panic and Flight
In particular, let us consider the logic of panic as part
of the story. The technological fable includes as central
to the story the disruption of ordinary life by the monster. The threat produces mass panic-people have to
flee from the awesome power of the threat. For example,
the War of the Worlds broadcast had panic as a part of the
story. But the press reported that those people who
thought the broadcast was news panicked too. Newspapers reported the "tidal wave of terror that swept the
nation": New Jersey highways were said to be jammed
with hysterical people, and other reports had farmers
joining in vigilante groups and people everywhere praying, driving out of cities, or even committing suicide. The media image of the event was that the
pseudo-news broadcast produced mass panic.
But did it? According to one calculation, only about
12 per cent of the adult population actually heard the
program (the much more popular Edgar Bergen and
Charlie McCarthy show was opposite it), only 28 per cent
of those who did hear it believed it was a real news bulletin, and all told only 2 per cent of the population was
at all excited by the program! And if panic means fear
and flight, only a minute statistical fraction responded
to the program by action. 10 If our thesis is correct, the
press reported panic because panic there must be as
part of the logic of the story.
Similarly, in 1973 Swedish radio broadcast a tale of a
fictitious nuclear accident at an uncompleted nuclear
power plant at Barseback. The story was typical of the
technological fable. It told of a supposed failure in the
plant's cooling system that resulted in a major radioactive leak which winds carried out over populated
9

David L . Althiede and Robert P. Snow , Media Logic (Beverly Hills ,
CA: Sage Publications, 1979).
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Karl Erik Rosnengren, Peter Arvidson, and Dahn turesson. "The
Baresback ' Panic': A Radio Programme as a egative ummary
Event," ActaSociolog-ica, XVIII , no. 4 (1979), 303-321.
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areas. Like the War of the Worlds broadcast, the program
used a news format as if it were a bulletin, complete
with sirens and well-known radio voices. Within an hour
and throughout the next day, Swedish and then international news media reported that the story had resulted in a mass panic. Interestingly, while there was
widespread debate in the media and Parliament about
the broadcast, no one apparently ever questioned the
assumption that there had in fact been a "real" panic.
But a team of sociologists later studied the effects of
the broadcast in the area affected, and the results of the
study told a quite different story. The study found that
in the area where the alleged panic occurred, some 20
per cent of the adult population had heard the program.
About 10 per cent of the population misunderstood it,
7-8 per cent were frightened, and only about 1 per cent
"reacted behaviorally" to it. The researchers found not
one single case of "panic flight. "11
Yet the news media in Sweden universally assumed
and reported that a panic occurred. This faulty reporting was based on the tiny fraction of the population
that did such things as call police and fire stations,
actions which gave the impression of mass panic. The
press "picked up on" rumors passed on by firemen and
other people and translated the rumors into "fact," because, we argue here, the fact of the panic conformed
with the media logic of the story.
Thus a non-event, defined as consistent with the story
line, helped to transform the story into what the authors
of the report call a "summary event," "[an event] staged
to summarize positive or functional processes or structures." The Baresback story they term a "negative summary event," one which deals with "bad" states
of affairs. 12 Such a negative summary event can be
placed in the tradition of the technological fable. The
"panic" is part of the story as an imaginative representation by the news media of what is supposed to happen
in such events. The panic made sense to newsmakers
because it "fit": that is what happens in technological
fables.
It is our contention that even though there were
dramatic options exercised by the American mass media
in the coverage of Three Mile Island, there were also
thematic regularities consistent with the media logic of
the technological fable. The event was defined
and "summarized" by various media. The drama included much about the extent to which the event had
disrupted ordinary life around the TMI plant. Both T
and print media told of the mass concern about the accident and included scenes and images of the impulse
to flee and even of actual flight.
11

Ibid., pp. 307-308 .

12

Ibid., p. 31 9.
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Some of the estimates of mass flight made by the national media seem inflated, and
assumptions that many thousands of people were "on the verge of panic" appear unwarranted.

ABC-TV on March 30 told of people "on the verge of
panic" and of "momentary panic," with stories and interviews of people fleeing. On April 1, we were told
that "many people have fled the area" and were shown
shots of deserted streets. But CBS reported on the
thirtieth that there was "no panic," although there was
fear and confusion. NBC on the same day showed shots
of fire trucks with sirens wailing driving through the
streets and of people leaving the area on their own.
Time magazine (April 9, 1979) reported that "while
there was no panic, thousands of residents left the area
of their own volition." The next week (April 16, 1979)
Tt'me told us that "100,000 or so of the area's 650,000
residents who had left started to trickle home." But
Newsweek that same week reported that "ultimately, an
estimated 60,000 residents moved out voluntarily."
Thus all the media told of massive flight, although
they differed as to whether there was any mass panic
and on the magnitude of the flight.
Neither could the official reports entirely agree. The
President's Commission staff report simply estimated
that a "sizeable minority of the residents" left the area,
and that "on Friday ... much of the population began
to leave Middletown voluntarily." The Report of the
Governor's Commission spoke of the "voluntary large-
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scale exodus of area citizens after the governor's advisory," but noted only 171 people who were sheltered
and cared for at centers established to help those who
had fled. A study of mental-health effects of the accident
for the President's Commission estimated that "at least
150,000 people left the area." When the Kemeny Report
was released, newspapers still varied in their estimates.
The Chicago Tribune estimated that "50,000 persons
packed up and left" (October 31, 1979).

Did Mass Flight Actually Occur?
But contacts by the author with some local media and
local police and civil defense authorities cast doubt on
all these flight figures. Clippings provided by the
Lebanon, Pa. News include a headline from March 29:
"No Panic Noted in Wake of Nuclear Crisis at TMI,"
and another from April 6, "Realtors Report No Panic
Selling Since TMI Crisis." The Lebanon County Emergency Management facility noted that it had "very little
movement" over the incident, and its director estimated
that approximately 5 per cent of the population in that
county left, about 1,800 people. The Pennsylvania State
Police noted that traffic that weekend in the counties
around the plant did not seem unusually heavy. Local
police officials in the towns with about 13,000 people
within a five-mile radius of the plant claimed no extraordinary exodus. And in the four directly-adjacent
counties (York, population 272,603; Dauphin 223,834;
Lancaster 319,693; and Cumberland, 167,340), official
noted no mass exodus. Given the size of such populations, mass panic or flight would certainly have b en
noticeable.
So was the flight from TMI real or imagined? In the
absence of a systematic study, it is difficult to ay. How
the various media came up with their figur and imag
of mass flight is not known. It hould be not d that
they did not consistently empha iz th dimen ion of
flight, and indeed they often aid that th re wa no
panic. But some of their figure do em inflat d , and
assumptions that many thou and of p opl wer "on
the verge of panic" app ar unwarrant d.
More study i required as to how and why p opl
around the plant decid d not to fl . It app ar to b
the case that a rumor pr ad thr ugh th urr uncling
town on March 30 that th plant wa about to pl d ,
destroying v rything for mil around. But appar ntly
thi rumo!" did not cau pani r fli ht· i w probabl
damp ned by a tel v· d tat m nt b
u I ar R
latory Commi i n pok man Har I
ernorRichardThornbur h rumor ontr 1 nt r.13
13
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One retrospective article declared t hat at TM/ "more than 150,000 people fled their homes
in terror" and that "the flight was chaotic and uncontrolled." Maybe next time it will be.

It also appears to be the case that some people around
the plant experienced "demoralization" and deep fears
and anxieties. But again the statistics do not seem · to
reveal mass crisis. Thirty per cent of the population
reported themselves as "quite upset" following the accident, and 10 per cent experienced increased stress
symptoms. This means that 90 per cent of the people did
not have increased stress symptoms (and some of those
who did might have had them regardless of the accident)
and 70 per cent were not particularly upset.14

TM/ and the Technological Fable
If our notion is correct that TMI is a story in
the tradition of the technological fable, we must also
assess the media's role in the lack of panic around the
plant. The various media reporting the accident were
not consistent in their definition of the story. A consistent story line across all major media that the plant
was about to explode might have contributed to panic.
But local media (influenced perhaps by the power
company public-relations office) and some national
media resisted to varying degrees the logic of the technological fable. With multiple and conflicting stories
as to what was happening, the confused local resident
did not receive a clear message to flee.
But perhaps, too, we have to take into account the
fact that TMI was, as the press continually said, "unprecedented." People couldn't be certain that TMI
was in fact a new addition to the technological fable,
and tl\e "monster" was not quite palpable. The popular
aesthetics of the fable requires something more precisely identifiable than TMI offered. The Nation (April 21,
1979) noted that residents in the area "faced the radioactive fallout and threat of complete annihilation with a
suicidal grace, calmly resigning themselves to the situation regardless of the consequences ... gallows humor
such as 'I'll melt before I leave' displaced much of the
fear and brought the people together to share the common experience .... The people there were determined
not to be driven out by an unseen enemy .... Most of the
residents didn't believe what they couldn't see .... The
dreamlike quality of the fear, the unseen assassin in the
night ready to strike this fragile city down with a cloud
of clear vapor brought the people together for comfort
and safety."
Joumalistic rhetoric aside, this passage communicates a sense that the unseen quality of the threat made
it less real than, say, invading Martians or smog mon14

Bruce Dohrensend , " uclear Health Effects of the Nuclear Accident at Three Mile Island ," symposium overview at meeting of American Psychological Assn., 1980 ; James Coates , "Three Mile Island
Still Getting on Folks' erves ," Chicago Tribune, May 18 , 1980 ,
sec. 2, p . 12.
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sters. But the insidious nature of radiation has apparently left a residue offear in the neighborhood: locals still
blame physical and emotional stress on the plant, and
rumors circulate about how cancer will develop
in children within five years and how animals near the
plant are born with brittle bones, blindness, and other
radiation-caused maladies.
On the other hand, the quietistic reaction of the population may also be attributable to "learned helplessness."15 This argument suggests that because the evening news and other media sources so routinely emphasize dramas of chaos, disaster, and unpredictability,
people finally develop a sense of impotence and resignation in the face of events they cannot hope to control.
Perhaps the TMI story, although immediate and
threatening, caused no panic and flight because people
had learned helplessness in the face of disaster
and simply took a fatalistic attitude, as evidenced in
the "nuclear jokes."
In any case, the TMI tale is now part of the folklore
of technology, and any future story has a precedent in
this episode which will affect how it will be reported,
Perhaps mass acquaintance with the media drama of
TMI would contribute to people's reaction to another
accident. Perhaps the media would expect another accident to be worse and would look for panic and flight
to occur. Reporting of panic and flight might then contribute to actual mass panic and flight, since that would
seem to be the response appropriate to the drama. Or
perhaps people would react, like the TMI residents,
with quietude and fatalism.
A paper delivered at the American Culture Association convention last year asked whether the impact of
the War of the Worlds broadcast could be repeated and
offered helpful hints as to how it might be. The author
suggested that "a Three-Mile-Island-type incident
would work well, because it might present an imminent
danger to people over a vast part of the country. "16
Since TMI, that is clearly a possibility, since the media
have incorporated that accident into the tradition of
technological fantasy that is part of popular media
logic. On the first anniversary of the TMI accident,
various media recalled the incident, keeping alive the
folklore about it. One article declared that at TMI
"more than 150,000 people fled their homes in terror.
The flight was chaotic and uncontrolled. "17 Maybe
next time it will be.
Cl
15 Grace Ferrari Levine, " 'Learned Helples ness ' and the Evening
ews," Journal of Communication, X VII , no. 4 (Autumn , 1977 ),
100-10 5.

16 F. Dale Ware, "War of the Worlds: Could It Happen gain ." delivered at the

merican Culture ssociation meeting, 1980 , p . 4 .

17 Casey Bukro, " ccident at TMI put uclear Power on Hold ," Ch icago Tribun e, March 28 . 1980 , p. 4.
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Two brilliant film comedies share Carole Lombard,
the only great actress ever born in Fort Wayne.

Carole Lombard and
The World-as-Stage
Richard Maxwell
Two of the most brilliant American film comedies are Twentieth Century (1934) and To Be or Not to Be
(1942). These movies share Carole
Lombard, the only great actress ever
born in Fort Wayne, Indiana. They
also share a theme, that the world is
a stage. It was for Lombard, who
made forty-two films during her
short career. Twentieth Century began her stardom. To Be or Not to Be
ended it: she died in a plane crash
soon after its filming. Her professional life is thus framed by the
world-as-stage topos, a coincidence I
find suggestive. Life is short, art is
long. My subject is not just Lombard
but the thriving of an ancient idea
in an age of chaos.
If we've read some Shakespeare,
we are likely to remember that the
world can be imagined a stage. Ernst
Robert Curtius's magisterial European Lt"terature and the Latin Middle
Ages (1948) reveals how venerable
that commonplace is. It can be
traced back to Plato and t. Paul
among others. It is handed down

Richard Maxwell teaches English at
Valparai"so Uni"versity and -is The
r et' regular film cn"tic.
January 1982

through the Middle Ages to the
great figures of the Renaissance. It
achieves a kind of apotheosis in the
seventeenth-century dramas of
Calderon, "the first poet to make
the God-directed theatrum mundi
the subject of a sacred drama."
After Calderon, the world-as-stage
topos seems pretty well used upuntil Hofmannsthal gets hold of it
in the early twentieth century. It
then begins an extraordinary revival. Curtius's interpretation of
this point is crucial. He notes that
while Calderon wrote in a time when
God and the state apparently stood
firm, "Hofmannsthal's historical
situation is the very reverse." Hofmannsthal lived through the dissolution of an aging society. His
many plays and poems comparing
the world and the stage attempt (alas,
with only partial success) to recover
a lost tradition. Works like The Great
Salzburg Theater of the World (1921)
express Hofmannsthal's willed faith
in the idea of a Providential universe, where God is a puppet master
of sorts.
Enter Carole Lombard. She would
have looked out of place in The Great
Salzburg Theater of the World. In
Twentieth Century (filmed some five
years after Hofmannsthal died) she
was right at home. Written by Ben
Hecht and directed by Howard
Hawks, the film casts John Barrymore as Oscar Jaffe, a grandiloquent
stage director. He discover the
Lombard character, makes her into a
great actress (stage name Lily Garland), makes her his mistres too,
then loses her on both count b cause he is insanely pos e ive of
her. All thi happens in th fir t
reel: by the econd Jaffe is down th
tube . He ha acquired om p rverse notions about culture and inists on taging one ab urd hi torical
drama after anoth r. on of th m
have Garland all of th m fail. Th
final di a ter i Joan of Arc-a horrendou p tacle pla
f th ort
ha, had a oided writin a f
ar

before. Joan closes in Chicago and
leaves its backers ruined. 1 Jaffe's
only chance for solvency is to reacquire Lily Garland's services.
Immediately he has his opportunity, for they both end up on the
Twentieth Century Limited. Lily
Garland is now a movie star; she will
have to be won back to the theater
by the most deviously theatrical
means. During the course of their
train journey together, Jaffe stages
one absurd scene after another. Garland is alternatively mad and
amused. Nothing, she asserts, could
possibly convince her to work again
under Jaffe. Each of them strikes
magnificently theatrical poses; each
is consumed by a self-indulgent passion for role-playing. Towards the
end of the film there is a great scene
in which he almost breaks down her
resistance. He conceives the idea
that Lily Garland will play Mary
Magdalene in a multi-million dollar
staging of the New Testament. This
cannot help but be Lily's greatest
role ever. The Crucifixion-during
which she will weep at the foot of the
cross-will be staged with incredible
historical authenticity, including
real camels. When he mention th
camels, Barrymore i o enthu ia tic
that he virtually b come on ,
snorting and swayin hi way a ro
Lily's room. The ab urdity f th
whole prop ition dawn on h r, for
after briefly taking him
riou ly
he bur t into lau ht r.
Jaff ' la t att mpt on h r i
play d in a cliff r nt m d. H h
b en wound din th h uld r by a
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In Howard Hawks' Twentieth Century, the connection between world and stage is
perceived primarily as a joke-a joke by which we are both amused and seduced.
gunshot, for reasons too complex to
explain. With the help of his cohorts, he sets up a little death scene.
Garland is called to the bedside by
what she takes to be a dying man. He
has ... one last request, purely sentimental. Will she sign a contract
with him, so that for a moment
things will be just as they were in
the old days? Garland has evidently
read too many scripts like this one.
She has come to believe the cliches
of the theatrical death scene. Confusing melodrama and life she signs,
whereupon Jaffe cries out triumphantly. Once again she is working
for him. The show must go on.
The film would work if we didn't
know a thing about the actors, the
director, and the circumstances of
production. All the same, this extrinsic knowledge proves relevant.
Lombard the actress was in the position of the character she played:
both were young women on the verge
of stardom, both capable (at first)
of stiffening up during rehearsal.
In the film this point is made by
J affe's inimitable directorial technique: to loosen up Lily for her first
stage ,scream, he jabs a pin in her
rear. Sure enough, she screams convincingly. There is, it turns out, an
equivalent story about Lombard and
Hawks. He took her aside "and asked
what she would do if a monomaniac
like the Barrymore character tried
to push her around in the manner
outlined in the script. Lombard told
Hawks she'd never put up with such
treatment. Hawks told her to return
to the set and play the character as
Carole Lombard. The rest, as they
say, is history.''2 Maybe this happened, maybe it didn't. The fact remains that films like Twentieth Century generate stories of this sort.
Having accepted the interdependency of stage and world, we want it to
hold on every level possible. Like
2

Louis Giannetti, Masters of the American
Cinema (Englewood Cliffs, .J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), p. 190 , with a wonderful publicity still from Twentieth Century.
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Lily Garland, we accept performance
as truth. Like Oscar Jaffe, we crave
real camels. Not only does the world
become a stage, the stage expands
to encompass the world.
Twentieth Century is a film disconnected from history and society by
the very self-a!>sorption of its principals, so that the connection between world and stage is perceived
primarily as a joke-a joke by which
we are both amused and seduced.
The same is true of To Be or Not to
Be, except that here the joke has
taken on serious consequences. How
could it not, when the subject is
Hitler's invasion of Poland? The
director Ernst Lubitsch had come to
Hollywood in 1923. For two decades afterwards he was the premier
maker of sophisticated comedies,
specializing in the elusive "Lubitsch
touch." World War II was not the
most hospitable moment for this
artist. It was then, nonetheless, that
Lubitsch-with his assistant Melchior Lengyel-put together To Be
or Not to Be, the film often considered his finest.
Here, as in Twentieth Century,
Carole Lombard is at the center of a
comedy about world and stage- but
what a difference those eight years
have made! This time the Lombard
character is actually married to a
ham:JackBenny, playingJosefTura,
the greatest actor in Poland. Their
troupe plans to mount a production
attacking Hitler, when all of a sudden the Nazis invade. The theater
shuts down. About the same time, a
Nazi spy, posing as one Professor
Siletsky, acquires information that
will cost many lives unless it can be
immediately retrieved. This is the
dilemma which faces the Turas.
Using such actorly skills as they can,
they must somehow keep Siletsky
from delivering his fatal message.
So described, To Be sounds like a
World War II melodrama. It is nothing of the sort. This is evident in
the first scenes when the camera
focusses on Nazi officials interrogat-

ing a little boy about his parents'
political beliefs. Hitler's imminent arrival is announced. He enters
the room and declares "Heil myself!"
The camera pulls back to reveal a
frustrated director bawling out the
actor who perpetrated this line. We
are witnessing the Benny/Lombard
troupe's rehearsals for their play.
This motif of the comically-disrupted performance will recur
throughout the film. At first, it is
primarily associated with a sexual
battle between Tura and his wife.
She has an ungovernable affection
for young Polish pilots, the most irresistible of whom is played by a
boyish Robert Stack. Mrs. T arranges
for a dressing-room rendezvous with
Stack on the following terms: he is
to leave the audience when her husband-who is playing Hamletbegins the "To be or not to be" soliloquy. Stack gets up to move out;
Benny/Tura simply stares at him,
words frozen in his mouth. His expression is that of a man who cannot
comprehend what he sees. No less
than Barrymore in Twentieth Century,
this character has a fragile but persisting ego. Theatrical and sexual
mastery are often interchangeable
for him. It is a typical joke of the
film that his public humiliation as
an actor should be matched by a
private infidelity he does not as yet
suspect.
Once the Nazis arrive in Warsaw,
these problems of Tura's are further
magnified. His wife plays Mata Hari
to Professor Siletsky, meeting the
professor at his hotel for drinks, dinner, and who knows what else in an
effort to locate the incriminating
documents. Their Idyll is interrupted when Siletsky is called away to
what looks like Nazi headquarters.
He is actually in the hands of fake
Nazis, real actors. Assuming hi responsibilities as the greatest actor
in Poland, Tura pretends to be the
azi commander Colonel Ehrhardt.
He must stall Siletsky until his wife
can search the professor's belongThe Cresset

In Ernst Lubitsch's To Be or Not to Be, we see
comedy moralized and history theatricalized.
ings. There ensues an amazing dialogue. It cannot be very well described; one can only single out
moments. Siletsky tells Tura that he
is known back in Berlin as "Concentration Camp Ehrhardt," a piece of
news which inspires them both with
merriment. "So they call me Concentration Camp Ehrhardt?" Tura
repeats, ever more irrelevantly.
Siletsky becomes suspicious. Realizing that he has been duped, he pulls
a gun on Tura and rushes out a convenient door-into the darkened
theater. There follows a complicated chase, which culminates in a
beautifully-choreographed bit where
Siletsky is shot on stage, in a spotlight. This crossing of theater and
world proves fatal to its dupe.
Having unintentionally dispatched Siletsky, Tura must assume
his identity. Appropriately disguised, he proceeds to Siletsky's hotel, which his wife will not be able
to leave until the professor returns.
Here Tura meets the real Colonel
Ehrhardt (who has never seen the
real Siletsky). Tura is forced to reenact the dialogue he just had with
Siletsky, only this time, of course,
he is playing the professor's part.
From this point on, the viewer is
drawn into an intrigue which is
crazy because it is also logical. The
culmination of the madness comes in
a scene about corpses and false mustaches which I would hesitate to unravel. Let it only be said that Benny,
Lombard, and the whole troupe
eventually end up in England. The
last we see of them, he is again playing Hamlet and she once more sets
a meeting with an aspiring lover
during "To be or not to be." The
more things change in this marriage, the more they stay the same.
In a generally excellent book on
film comedy Gerald Mast complains
that the later Lubitsch became les
cynical, more sentimental than before o reducing his tyle to mu h. 3
I di agree. In To Be or ot to Be, at
an
rate Lubitsch retained hi
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flair for farcical love intrigues and
delicate parables about life versus
art. He also gave his work a new
scope. Comedy is moralized, history
theatricalized. The film benefits
from both transformations. Imagining the world as a stage means imagining its coherence and perhaps its
controllability. If not Providential,
then at least human intelligence is
celebrated. The film recalls something of the brilliant cynicism displayed by Hawks and Hecht in
Twentieth Century. The two hammy
leads are still rivals in an absurd
struggle for primacy. Now, however,
there is something important to
fight about and to win through. The
world becomes a stage from a genuinely collective need.
Twentieth Century, of course, is
not the only possible reference
point by which we can judge the
extent of Lubitsch's success. We can
return, finally, to Curtius and Hofmannsthal. The former writes of the
1940s, "When the German catastrophe came, I decided to serve the
idea of a medievalistic Humanism
by studying the Latin literature of
the Middle Ages." It is doubtful
that he got to many movies while
doing this, but how fascinated he
might have been with To Be or Not
to Be. To some extent Lubitsch and
Curtius's revered Hofmannsthal
emerge from the same central European dramatic tradition, for both
worked with the great Max Reinhardt and both cultivated a certain
stylish decadence. Far more than
Hofmannsthal's rather precious
pastiches, To Be or Not to Be affirm
the power of an ancient topo in a
modern context. It bears out, in fact,
precisely that faith which Curtiu
affirmed by writing hi book: that
ideas are worth remembering, that
they can help us ke p our h ads.
The world-a - tage defin
mor
than Carole Lombard' care r.
3
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The Comic Mind: Comedy and the Mo ies
(Chica o and London : niver ity of hica o
Pre s, 1979). p . 224, a clas ic exampl of an
excellent writer pushing a the i loo far.

A Modest Address
Our Record on Refugees
Is Surprisingly Good
Albert R. Trost
The speaker at Valparaiso University's commencement this past
May was Poul Hartling, the United
Nations' high commissioner for
refugees. His talk was entitled
"Refugees-Our Neighbors." The
speech did what a commencement
address is supposed to do, call on
the graduates to be responsible
citizens of the world, be concerned
for their neighbors, and sacrifice
for the greater good of mankind.
The speech wa delivered in an
eloquent and dignified manner,
what one would expect from a world
statesman. Very few in the audienc
would have perceived it a tirrmg,
or even controver ial. One colleague was heard to r mark that
"he really did not ay anything
new." I am ur that many thought
that we w re cl arly up ta d on
that unday afternoon by our do
neighbor, th
m r it of otr
Dam . In outh B nd Pr id nt

r t wn'tes f requentl for
r
t on political affairs. He is
a graduate of Valparaiso
niversit ,
where he is current/ Professor and
Chairman of the epartment of Political cience.
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American refugee policy indicates real movement towards fairness, flexi bility, and a
willingness to defer to international organizations. It seems truly "progressive."
Reagan made his first public speech
since the assassination attempt.
Given
Hartling's
diplomatic
position, one could not realistically
expect him to make ringing condemnations or bring grave offense
to a host audience or their government. His agency, the Office of the
High Commissioner for Refugees,
depends on voluntary contributions
from governments and private
organizations. The United States
is the largest contributor. In his
speech on that Sunday afternoon,
Hartling commended Americans
for their generosity, though few in
the audience would have known any
of the details about the extent or
the nature of our giving. In fact,
few would have known of the existence of Mr . . Hartling's agency.
(The recent award of the Nobel
Peace Prize to Mr. Hartling's office
has presumably changed that.) Mr.
Hartling did say that other nations
were generous also, perhaps even
more generous than the United
States in proportion to their resources.
But the speech contained very
little in the way of condemnation.
Mr. Hartling seemed content to
make the audience aware of the
problem, the world's refugees. The
problem, he said, was that "refugees need to be fed, clothed and
sheltered. They need to find new
homes, if they cannot return to
their old ones, and to be assisted
to attain self-sufficiency in them."
To make the problem more
graphic to his audience of affluent
graduates, their parents, and faculty,
he went on to say, "I do not overlook the problems and difficulties
facing the industrialized countries.
Newspapers speak to you of discontentment over economic conditions, unemployment, and inflation.
I have no doubt the refugees would
love to have those problems, the
problems of affluence rather than of
deprivation, of surplus rather than
want." He probably gauged this
30

audience of middle-class Americans
correctly; for_ them, awareness of
the problem was a major step forward.
At least one listener, of somewhat
liberal inclinations and with some
exposure to critical academic studies
of American foreign policy, was
sure that only. Mr. Harding's sensitive political and diplomatic position kept him from being much
harsher in judging American response. Determined to uncover
some underlying negligence, shortsightedness, mean partisanship, or
national selfishness, I put some
library research on my agenda for
the following weeks.
Did the consideration of the
refugee problem in Washington
stir up the intense partisanship of,
say, food-stamp funding? Certainly
the Reagan administration could
be expected to lower the priority
of this kind of program? Since
solutions to the refugee problem
seemed to require a heavy commitment to the United Nations, was
the issue not discussed in the heated
context of internationalism versus
isolationism? Might there not even
be an occasional reactive expression
of racism from a public officeholder? I was surprised to find that
few of my expectations were met.
To begin with, there is very little
national debate over refugees. The
Cuban exodus of a year ago is an
exception in that there was considerable debate over how to handle
the problem of settlement. Interestingly, the Cubans probably do not
even qualify as refugees under the
United Nations use of that term,
and this unexpected migration did
little to change the nature of the
debate in the United States. To say
that there is little debate is to indicate that there is little attention
given in any public forum to the
question. The typical pattern is to
give the question cursory notice in
budget hearings before the relevant
Congressional committee . This is
usually in the form of te timony

by the responsible executive-branch
official. It is rare for other witnesses
to be called. It is even more rare for
there to be hostile questioning by
committee members.
The fact of little national debate
also points up the seeming consensus on the policy question. This
consensus is evident among members
of Congress as well as between Congress and the executive branch. One
is struck by the rather remarkable
agreement between Senator Edward
Kennedy and Senator Strom Thurmond on the basic outline of the
Refugee Act of 1980. There is also
the simultaneous advocacy of a
policy by Congressman Derwinski
(R., Illinois) on the one hand and
Congresswoman Holtzman (D.,
New York) on the other. With respect to appropnat10ns in the
refugee area, Congress appears to
be quite willing to go along with
the suggestions of the Reagan administration. In the passage of the
Refugee Act of 1980, the Carter
administration followed the policy
leads of Senator Kennedy.
The record of American refugee
policy also indicates some real
movement in that policy towards
fairness, flexibility, and a willingness to defer to international organizations. In other words, the policy
seems to be truly "progressive."
In the past refugees were treated
as immigrants and the old quotas
with regard to country of origin
prevailed. Of course, exceptions
were often granted when ideological
concerns (Hungarians) or humanitarian concerns seemed to dictate.
The Refugee Act of 1980, the
most recent statement of policy,
recognizes that refugees are different from other immigrants,
having been forced to leave their
country, and grants to them a eparate and much-expanded earl
quota (50 000). Exception to thi
ceiling can be granted more quick!
than previously had been the case.
An explicit a ylum pro i ion i
The Cresset

The response to the refugee problem seems unbelievable. It is certainly atypical
to have so much consensus and so little vehement debate on a public policy issue.
included in the immigration law
for the first time. The definition
of a refugee is considerably broadened from that used in previous
laws and made to conform to the
standard used by the United Nations.
Our older understanding of refugees
applied only to those "from Communism" and some areas of the
Middle East. The new definition
and quota potentially cover every
area of the world. Finally, the law
attempts to mandate better coordination of refugee policy by
setting up new administrative
machinery, the Office of the United
States Co-ordinator for Refug~e
Affairs and the Office of Refugee
Resettlement. The latter focuses
on implementation of policy through
government aid for settling refugees in this country.
The record of the United States
in handling some real refugee
problems in the last few years, even
without the new law, is laudable.
The most impressive feature is the
quantity of refugees settled in the
United States. In 1979, 200,000 were
placed, almost all of them coming
from Southeast Asia or Russia and
Eastern Europe. The migration in
the latter case was mainly of Jews.
114,000 Cubans came shortly after.
Another admirable feature in the
resettling of these refugees was
the prominent and effective role
played by voluntary agencies.
Eleven voluntary agencies did most
of the resettling with the aid of
government grants. Six of the
eleven were church-related. Beside being compatible with a liberal
ethic that devalues the growth of
government, the use of voluntary
agencies involves a large segment
of the society in the solution to
the problem.
t lea t at the level of public
policy the re ponse to the refugee
problem eem almost unbelievable.
It certainly i atypical to have o
much con en u and o little vehement debate. I the polic ma]anua , 1 '2

chinery working as the abstract
models say it should ? If it is working
well, it certainly will face greater
tests in the future. Just as Dr. Hartling's address at the commencement
was for many the first intrusion of
the refugee problem, so throughout
the country public awareness of the
refugee dilemma is only beginning.
The Indochinese, Cuban, and Haitian migrations are only very recent developments.
The acceptance of the first of
these may have benefited from
some feelings of guilt over involvement in Southeast Asia. The second,
the Cuban, can be covered by a
general hostility to the Castro
regime. However, there are between
ten and twelve m illion refugees
in the world right n ow! That three
to four million of these are in Africa
will be news to almost all Americans. The policy machinery will
suffer a much greater test here in
both the numbers involved and the
distance from direct American interests and concern. Resettlement
in the United States will probably
not arise as a viable solution to the
African problem, but American
resources will be called on because
we are the supp lier of over onequarter of the funds for international agencies involved in solving
refugee problems.
There are other demands which
will enter the debate as public
awareness expands and interest
groups form over the allocation of
resources in this area. Our own
disadvantaged will demand ju tice
in the face of what is perceived a
privileged treatment for new entrants. There wa a hint of thi in
the Cuban migration. Rivalri
will emerge between the diff rent
group of re ettled refuge
ov r
the treatment of memb r of th ir
familie
till not
grated.
cultural pre rvationi t
ha not y t emer ed amon
can to the
r c nt mi

However, there was a hint of the
ugly potential here in the reaction
to South Vietnamese refugee fishermen on the Texas coast. The
most conspicuous feature of the
reaction was the involvement of
the Ku Klux Klan. Greater numbers of refugees in the United
States wilJ challenge our tolerance.
Finally, to deal with the large
numbers of refugees now in only
temporary havens or countries of
first asylum, the concerned United
Nations agencies - the Office of
the High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency (for the
Palestinian refugees) will require
a greater amount of authority and
a much larger grant of funds. The
amount of money so far involved
in the American budget for aid to
these international agencies, about
$215 million, is so small in relation
to other claims that it has not yet
prompted open conflict. However,
the budget of the Office of the
High Commissioner for Refug e
alone has grown over 500 per c nt
in the last five year . With thi
kind of growth and with an Am rican
commitment to supply about 28 p r
cent of the budget, chall ng
to
this commitment b com
mor
likely.
The High Commi ion r' m1 sionary journey into Indiana a
welcome, v n if it
with a f w yawn . h
for him If on hi
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Rumblings from a
Dormant Volcano
John Strietelmeier
One of the chief difficulties I have
in writing this column is that I can
never venture beyond the platitude
line into any area of serious criticism without seeming to he attacking
some good, personal friend.
All of my life, I have been blessed
with a wide circle of friends. The
great majority of them are or have
been academics like myself. That is
to say, they (we) have been-along
with confidence men, North Atlantic
steamship gamblers, patent-medicine salesmen, claimants to imperial
Russian titles of nobility, and advertising executives-people who
live by their (our) wits. Folk wisdom,
which is rarely mistaken in identifying J>Otential dangers to the survival of the human species, long
ago- and for the best of practical
reasons-identified such people
as among those not to be trusted
with any large voice in the making
of those decisions by which societies live. And critics have found
them ideal as specimens for social
or moral dissection because not only
do they display a wide range of interesting faults and eccentricities,
but do so more patently and more
transparently than do people of
most other social and moral strata.
Most of my very closest friends
are clustered in a lens of the academic stratum known as academic
administration. These include five
college and university presidents,
past and present; four chief academic officers, also past and present
(plus myself on those days when I
am on friendly terms with myself);
32

a couple of other kinds of vicepresident;
passel of deans, academic and otherwise; and a slew
(also slue, fr. Irish sluagh) of department chairpersons.
Which is all by way of exculpatory
preface to the main thrust of this
column, which is a reflection on that
most sacred of academic humbugs,
the curriculum.
We at Valparaiso have just welcomed back from the land of the
walking dead a select committee of
our most respected colleagues. They
had gone there-may Heaven forgive me-on my recommendation
in the last months of my academic
vice-presidency when, having no
more rabbits to pull out of my
sleeve, there seemed to be no other
way to give an impression of activity than to fiddle with the curriculum. Their assignment was to
fiddle with the general education
requirements.
It's like the thing writers do
when they really can't think of anything to say and aren't yet ready
to get down to the hard business of
pumping their red blood onto the
white sheet in the typewriter. First
they will open (or close) windows.
Then they sharpen pencils. Then,
perhaps, clean the typewriter. Then
check the paper supply, perhaps
even double-checking to make sure
that all of the sheets are actually
8½ by 11 inches. Anything, in
other words, to delay that awful
moment when they have to bleed
that first drop of blood onto the
white page.
So it is in academia. Teaching is
hard work, very hard. Research,
while often more fun, is still very
hard and it consumes hours like
minutes. Counseling chews up your
insides. And writing will (obviously)
drive you mad.
The institutional device for postponing that awful moment when it
simply can no longer put off addressing itself to these hard jobs

a

is fiddling with the curriculum. And
to ensure that nobody suspects that
it is an evasive strategy, institutions
summon their best people to direct
the enterprise. You don't find the
institution's cadre of certified
losers on the Committee to Reinvent
the University, or whatever its
local name may be. What you assemble for this task is a sample of
that priceless element of the faculty
which, if left alone, might, by sheer
professional achievement, lead the
institution on to distinction.
And the revisions which they
recommend will indeed almost
always be a significant improvement
over what the institution was doing
before. Basic presuppositions can
not, of course, be attacked. They
have all long since been intertwined
with departmental self-interests
which, like God's mercies, "shall
endure when suns and moons shall
shine no more." But within every
curriculum there are areas where
fiddling does not really enrage
anybody and persuasive arguments can be made for the committee's view that a particular
change would be an improvement.
If one were to suggest that nobody
has ever really learned anything
that he/she did not really want to
learn, it might call into question
the whole
curriculum-building
enterprise. So that suggestion is
not likely to be made. You revise a
curriculum for the same reasons
that you climb Mt. Everest or take
out the garbage: because it's there.
And, of course, because if there
were no curricula to prescribe what
courses students must take, the
little rascals would probably go
wandering about listening only to
those of us who seem to have omething to say. And that, we will all
agree, is no way to run a univer it .
More on this next month. nles
of course that crowd out there with
the tar bucket and the ack of feathers
i looking for me.

~-

••

The Cresset

